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ABSTRACT 
In our study, we summarize the problems and sources ofproblems of 
traditional State Owned Enterprises. We examine the institutional change in H - share 
companies and the benefit and drawback of getting listed in the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange. The Restructuring methods of the State Owned Enterprises (SOE) are 
identified and categorized. The reduction in agency cost, transaction cost and 
uncertainty has been studied, where unsolved problems and newly introduced 
problems are also discussed. Finally, we conclude our discussion with the case study 
on Shanghai Petrochemical as a typical representative of SOE who listed in the Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange as H share. 
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After over 40 years of ruling under the central economic planning, most ofthe 
stated-owned enterprises have become inefficient and incompetent organizations. 
Under the socialist economic system, the State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) 
were responsible for the “total care" of its workers that they were virtual “little 
society". To the central government, the SOEs were also their mechanisms to "full" 
employment. The lifetime excess employment and equal payment compensation 
scheme were the roots of the inefficient workforce. 
All employees were provided with the education, catering, housing, medical, 
retirement benefits, etc. to their employees and their families, which added up to huge 
burden to the enterprises financially and starve the organizations for its capital for 
development. 
Besides, the central economic plan dictated the operation of the SOEs, they 
had no control over the resources allocation, the production and the price and supply 
to the market. 
As a result, a large number of SOEs were in deep red and huge indebtedness to 
the banks and suppliers. The government budget was largely used to subsidize the ill-
performed SOEs. 
With the opening up of the market and the government is determined to 
perform a series of reform in the SOEs to bring to the implementation of share-
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holding systems. The upraising of the domestic stock markets bring the opportunities 
for the SOEs to absorb the capital which they are in great needs for financial health 
and business development. 
Objectives 
In particular, well before the reunification ofHong Kong to the PRC, Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange has been a stage for the SOEs to gain access to international 
pool of funds and bring it management to international standards. 
In the following discussions, we would try to explore the fundamental 
institutional changes taken place in the SOEs listed in Hong Kong stock market. We 
conducted a series of contacts and background research on the H-share listing SOEs, 
including, fax questionnaire interviews, phone interviews, field visits, books, 
newspaper and periodical reviews, etc. in an attempt to get a well-rounded picture on 
the issues and then generalize our findings. 
In our study, we attempt to go into the roots of the SOEs reform by starting 
from the background and problems of the SOEs under the planned economic system. 
After a brief review of the upraising of the stock market and share listing 
history, we will bring to you the reasons for listing in Hong Kong through our 
discussion on the problems with the domestic markets. A comparison would also be 
made with the overseas listing in the United States. 
Then we would move on to the preparation of the H-share listing process, the 
controversial restructuring process, a brief touch on listing procedures and the 
discussion on difficulties and issues of concem in the listing process. 
We would then divide our discussion into three sessions where we would 
further explore the cost and benefits of the institutional changes through the aspects of 
3 
changes in transaction cost, agency cost, and uncertainty. We would try to support 
our findings with the real case situation of the H-shares company and our focus case 
source would be first hand information from the Beijing North Star Company which 
is rooted from a SOE of the new generation. 
Finally, we would conclude our discussion with the case study of the Shanghai 
Petrochemical Company Limited that is the largest and one of the oldest SOEs in the 
petrochemical industry. We hope to bring out the tremendous changes brought about 
by the H-share listing to the traditional (old-generation) giant SOEs and discuss the 
pros and cons of the central issues. 
Methodology 
We have employed both primary sources and secondary sources for our study. 
For primary research, we visited Beijing for an interview with the director and 
company secretary of the Beijing North Star in February 1998 and conducted a 
numbers of fax and telephone interviews with other H - share companies. For 
secondary sources, we studied the prospectus and annual reports of 38 H - share 
companies, conducted literature review on books andjoumals on the economic reform 
and H - share listing related topics, etc. Besides, we reviewed newspaper articles in 
recent years on the issues and case companies. We analyze the information by using 
statistics and other visually understandable presentation methods. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE PROBLEM OF STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES (SOEs) 
A lot of articles and discussions have been made on the problem of China's 
State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). Sustained low efficiency and loss making has been 
a big burden to the operation and development of the SOEs. Although the amount of 
profit created by the SOEs is still much greater than the loss suffered (profit before 
tax was RMB 288 billion and the loss was RMB 48 billion in 1994 \ the rate of 
increase oflosses over the total profits created has indicated that the problem of SOEs 
is severe. 
The average annual profit growth during 1988-1994 was 8.4% and the average 
loss growth of which was 34.4%. In 1996，the loss amount of SOEs has reached 
HKD64.75 billion. 
Table 1 
Loss of SOEs during the year 1990�1996 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
^ T x ^ ^ T ^ 34.9 36.7 45.3 44.3 48.0 N/A 64.75* 
m R M B Qjil.)  
source: State Statistic Bureau 
* in Hong Kong Dollar, 
On one hand, inadequate fund due to accumulation of debt has deterred the 
enterprise from investing sufficiently for new production facilities and technologies. 
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and hence the competitiveness and the ability to catch up with the pace of 
industrialization. With the recently implemented "Macro Economic Control" policy in 
1993 by former vice prime minister Zhurongji, the shortage of capital has made the 
problem of SOEs worse. 
On the other hand, irrespective of the profitability of the enterprises，surplus 
labour and redundant staff cannot be fired while new recruitment has to be made from 
time to time in order to assist the government in lowering the unemployment rate. 
The SOEs suffer further from providing a wide range ofbenefits to all the staff and 
their dependants such as housing, education, medical services and retirement 
pensions. And the workers become too reliant on the enterprise for the providing of 
social services. As a result, around 30-50% of workers of the SOEs become 
'employedjobless'(在岗失业）. 
Moreover, the generally poor management of SOEs has not been able to fully 
utilize existing capacity and capability of the enterprises. Actually, due to historical 
reason, the SOEs were established for economic development and for the livelihood 
of people, neither for making profit nor for trading purpose. All the supplying and 
collecting of materials were arranged by the State by allocation and the SOEs were 
not adaptive to commercial activities. 
In order to solve the traditional problems of SOE, a change was needed. A 
change that can reform the SOEs from solely owned by the state to self-operating 
entity surviving in the fi:ee market. 
1 "A Macro Analysis of China's State Enterprises Problem", China Viewpoints No.l (June 
1996) 
6 
THE SQE REFORM 
Since the 十一届三中全会 in 1978, the SOEs reform has experienced a 
number of stages. 
First Stage, 1983 
The first ever discussed was to implement the tax-for-proflt (^ >J 改税）575{6^1� 
The idea of tax-for-profit was the proportion of the sharing of profit. The country 
took the most, the enterprise took less and the individual took the minimal. 
The direct implication was that tax-for-profitwill ensure the country took the 
most benefit financially. Therefore, the tax-for-profit had taken a dominant position 
and had very influential position towards contract responsibility system (承包 i^J). 
Second Stage, 1988 
At this time, the main controversial focus was whether to implement contract 
responsibility system or the shareholding system (股份希|]). 
Contract Responsibility System 
A large variety of contract responsibility system was used in China since 1987 
because it guaranteed the State that 
• certain amount of profit could be delivered in time 
• certain planned task can be completed 
• linkage between wages and performance enhance the efficiency of the 
enterprise 
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The advantage and disadvantage of contract responsibility is summarized in 
the following table. 
Advantages of contract responsibiUty system 
• Appropriate separation of ownership and management 
• Settle the relationship between the State and the enterprise by means of 
a contract 
• Link the benefit of the workers with the contract responsibility 
• Easy to operate with low cost 
• More adaptive during the exchange of old and new system 
Disadvantages of contract responsibility system 
• Do not have standardized basis, i.e. enterprise can bargain the 
responsibility with the State 
• Short term contract has short term effect only 
• The owner is still outside of the enterprise, therefore the enterprise 
only responsible for the gain but not the loss 
• The enterprise set the contract responsibility to each department where 
inter-flow between department become hindered 
• The contract term is fixed for several years and the enterprise become 
not responding to changes in external environment 
The main argument was that the contract responsibility system did not have 
clear definition on property ownership. The enterprise cannot not run independently, 
hence the producer or the trader who bear the profitability cannot run the business 
with autonomy. 
Shareholding System 
For shareholding system, actually there are four kinds of shareholding systems 
and two forms of shareholding company. 
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Four kinds of shareholding systems 
1. Legal person hold the share of the enterprise 
2. Internal employee hold the share ofthe enterprise 
3. Company share offered to the public, but not traded on the 
exchange 
4. Company share offered to the public and traded on the exchange 
The first and second kind of shareholding system are widely used, where the 
third kind is only used in Guangdong, Hainan and Fujian and the fourth kind mainly 
used in Shanghai & Shenzhen. 
The two forms of shareholding company are thejoint stock company and the 
limited liability company. The differences of which are summarized below. 
Joint stock company 
• Every share has the same value 
• Shareholder bear limited liability according to the amount of 
share owned 
• The company is responsible for the debt 
• Upon approval, the company can issue and trade the share to 
the public 
• The number of shareholder should not be less than a certain 
number, no upper limit 
• One vote per share 
• The company should publicize the accounting report audited 
by chartered accountant 
Limited liabiUty company 
• All the asset of the company are not divided by shares 
• The company issue certificate to the shareholder, no issue of 
share 
• The transfer of company share is strictly controlled 
• A limit on the number of shareholders 
• Shareholder share profit and bear liability according to the 
capital invested 
The advantages and disadvantages of shareholding system can be summarized 
as follow, 
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Advantages of shareholding system 
• Separation of government from the enterprises 
• Self responsible for profit and loss 
• Long term enterprise behavior 
• Better structure 
• The value of the country asset can be preserved and grow 
• Increase efficiency 
• Convert the expenditure into production 
• Enhance the competitiveness in international market competition 
• Introduce employee share, an incentive to let employee to work hard 
Disadvantages of shareholding system 
• Cannot immunize against imperfect law and regulation, and the 
unhealthy market 
• Not good enterprise having low economical return, yet have to provide 
a lot of social benefit 
• Introduce speculation activities in the stock market, when listed 
In considering the function of shareholding system, we have to be careful that 
it is not a perfect system. If implemented properly, shareholding system can help 
improve the management of the enterprise. Yet, the shareholding system cannot 
replace the management because shareholding system is only a system of defining the 
ownership of right and asset. 
However, whether the shareholding system can achieve the objective of the 
SOEs reform such as the separation of government from the enterprises and the 
change in operation method of the enterprises is still subjected to the attitude of the 
government. 
Relationship between Contract Responsibility System and Shareholding System 
In fact. Contract Responsibility System and Shareholding System are not 
comparable system. The contract responsibility system refers to the operation system 
. “ -
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of an enterprise. While the shareholding system characterize the ownership by the 
percentage of equity and debt. 
In other words, contract responsibility system can be used in shareholding 
system and vice versa. 
Third Stage, 1989 
The after tax underwritten system (税后承包制），a continuation of the tax-
for-profit was discussed again. 
Mr. Deng visited the Southern part of China 
In the 14th Party Congress (十四大 ) a f t e r Mr. Deng visited the Southem part 
of the China in 1992, the SOEs reform entered into a new era. 
The 14th Party Congress stated that State Owned Enterprise, especially the 
large and middle scale should be reformed and be exposed to the market. The 
ultimate purpose of all, was to clearly define the ownership right, separation of the 
enterprise and the politics, and implement autonomy so that every enterprise can 
handle the business individually, responsible for the profit and loss and responsible 
for increasing the asset value of the enterprise in the market. 
The SOEs reform had not been successful in the past because of the 
dominance of the socialism system (社会主义体制 )over the public ownership 
(公有制）.The breakthrough right now has been the adoption of shareholding system 
(股份制)with the major shareholder remains to be the country. 
The Modem Enterprise System focuses on improving the asset management of 
the State by defining clearly the property right with a sound legal framework. 
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organizational reform, strengthened corporate governance, and implementation of 
financial accounting procedures in line with international standards. This includes 
• Incentive contracting 
• Gives SOE managers greater autonomy 
• SOE ownership diversification 
• Corporatization of SOEs and transforming SOEs into shareholding 
company 
Principally speaking, the focus of the SOEs reform is to transform large SOEs 
into shareholding company (月是份制公司）with the country remain to be the major 
shareholder and let the small enterprises tum into shareholding cooperation 
(月是份合作制）through employee buy-out (取工买断）.When the role of 
government retreat from the enterprises, especially when the shares are sold to the 
employees, the desire to succeed for the enterprise should increase and the incentive 
to make profit will be created. 
However, if the efficiency of the enterprises has to be compromised by not 
laying off redundant staff, then the restructuring of the reform may conflict with the 
original idea of SOEs reform. Does this mean that the unemployment problem will be 
the result of the SOEs reform? Fortunately, the economic reform during the past 19 
years has strengthened the economic power of the PRC. With the sustained strong 
economic growth and low inflation in these years, the estimated 20 million laid 
workforce can be absorbed by the market in five years time .^ 
12 
In order to determine whether shareholder system will work appropriately, a 
number of SOEs had been selected to test with the "modem enterprise system 
(现代企业制度 )” at the end of 1994. According to the report ^ 
• 80% 6f the selected enterprises, including 100 enterprises appointed by the 
State Council and 2000 enterprises appointed by the local government, 
have established the basic framework of the new system 
• 57 large pilot enterprises has been set up with significant progress 
• About 600 enterprises were bankrupted and about 630 enterprises were 
merged in the 58 pilot cities for merger and bankruptcy in 1996 
• 9,200 shareholding enterprises were established and account for about 
20% ofthe total assets of all industrial SOEs 
• Restructuring of SOEs with suitable conditions were carried out in various 
location 
From the test, factors that affect the generation of profit for the enterprises are: 
• Short of capital 
• High interest payment due to over debt and high interest rate 
• Bad debt between enterprises and inadequate market demand 
• High cost of raw material and fuel 
• Weak management system 
The 15th Party Congress 
2 "China's State Enterprise Reform After The 15th Party Congress "，China Viewpoints No. 9 
(October 1997) 
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After the 15th Party Congress (十五大)conducted on September of 1996， 
the leadership of the PRC government has strengthened the mind to solve the 
problems of SOEs by SOEs reform. The main objective of the reform is to change the 
operating method of the SOEs, either, to separate the government from the enterprises 
(政企分开 ) a n d to create a market mechanism where the enterprises have to survive 
on their own. In short term, the loss making condition of the SOEs should be 
remedied by more efficient profit making. In long term, the reform should enable the 
SOEs to grow big and be competitive in the worldwide market. 
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CHAPTER II 
STOCK MARKET BACKGROUND 
In the mid 1984，the first share-holding company (股份公司）,the Beijing 
Tianqiao Bai Huo Company Limited ( 北京天橋百貨股份有限公司 ) w a s 
established. The "share" issued was a 3-year security, the nature was similar to bonds. 
In 1984 Nov., Shanghai Diansheng Factory (上海電聲總戚 )es tab l i shed Shanghai 
In Xiang Se Bei Company (上海音響設備公司） i ssued first more regulated shares 
to the public. 
In 1 9 8 6 ,中國工商銀行商海信托投資公司證券部 e x e c u t e d t h e f i r s t 
over-the-counter trading transaction. 
In December 1990 and M y 1991, the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
(上海證券交易所）,SHSE and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (深圳證券交易所）， 
SZSE, started trading. It marked a new era for the development of the security market 
in China. 
In December 1990，Securities Trading Quotation System, STAQ, started to 
operate providing off-market trading for legal person shares (法人股）. 
In February 1992, the two Stock Exchange started to issue RMB-denominated 
B-share to people in Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan and foreign countries. The PRC 
residents are not allowed to invest in B-share. 
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Starting from 1993，the National Electronic Trading Systems, NETS, provides 
national wide security quoting, trading, clearing, and other integrated services. 
In June and July 1993，青島吟酒 and 上海石化 became the first two state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) listed in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE), out of 
the first batch of 9 companies, all SOEs, selected by the PRC Government to be listed 
overseas. 
In 1994, two companies,山東華能 and 華能國際 issued first N-share in the 
New York Stock Exchange, raised capital US$ 960 millions. 
Table 2 
Number ofH-share Co. and N-share Co. listed in 1993�1997 
Year No. of Selected Companies Listed Co. Listed Co. 
H-share N-shares 
1993 r^ Batch 9 6 -
1994 2"^ Batch 22 9 2 
1995 3[d Batch 7 2 ~ 
1996 6 
1997 16 




Advantages of the Listing Status 
Benefits to the PRC Government- A strong support for the SOE Reform in PRC 
Sources of Capital for State Development 
Stock market can be a channel to make use of international funds to facilitate 
the development of industries, especially those with strategic importance in PRC. 
Reduce the dependence of the SOEs on Government subsidies 
One of the subsidies is the interest rate subsidy. In 1995, the government 
withdrew the interest subsidies and raise interest for 13 industries from 11.6% to 
15.3%. 
As result of getting listed, the SOEs can reduce the dependence on the bank 
loan and government funds. They can afford to payoff their debts and thus it reduces 
the impact on the phasing out of the interest subsidies by the government 
In the case ofNorth Star, before listing, initially they have a debt ratio of 
nearly 70% which is quite high across the industry. After the restructuring and just 
before the listing, the company to be listed has a debt ratio of48%. After the listing, 
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the debt ratio of the parent company and the listed company were 50% and 32% only, 
inFeb 1998. 
Other price subsidies, like the oil prices, would also be lifted towards the 
international market prices. For example, in the cases for the petrochemical H-shares 
companies: the Beijing Yanhua, Zhenhai and Shanghai Petrochemical. 
Reduce the risk of bankruptcy of the SOEs 
The reduction of debt level with equity injection and the removal of social 
burden make the SOEs more financially and less vulnerable towards bankruptcy risk 
which would bring about the unemployment problems and thus social instability. 
Better preservation ofthe state-owned assets 
Getting listed will improve the financial and management efficiency, which 
helps stop the loss of state-owned assets through the inefficient management ofthe 
SOEs. 
A means to cash in the share-holding of the state 
Although majority of the shares of listed company is held by the government, 
through listing, a market is made ready for the government to cash in their share 
interest to meet future needs. Without which, there would be hard to find a^ome 
suitable buyers with enough funds. The negotiations would be a costly process and 
price would be suppressed. 
The Benefits to the SOEs 
The SOEs can gain many benefits from the listing status; 
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Capital for initial business development 
The capital from stock market provides the capital needed for the 
expansion and facilities updates, etc. for the SOEs to increase their strength in the 
market. 
Channel for continuous fund-raising 
The stock market is an important source of fund to fuel the long-term 
development of the company. The company can raise fund through issue ofnew 
shares, right issues, stock dividend, or private placing to institution investors, etc. 
Pressure for profitability 
The company must maintain growth of profit and business development to 
retain the investment interest and enhance the liquidity oftheir stock. 
A channel for merger and acquisition 
For those companies, which would like to grow their business through merger 
and acquisition, the market would provide the market price for their stock and they 
can use the exchange of shares one of the option to purchase. 
Publicity and credibility 
Apart from the period for IPO, the company would gain great public exposure 
through the media in the announcement ofinterim, annual results or major news 
release, etc., which would help gain it international reputation. It would also bring 
about improvement position to solicit customers or suppliers, especially for those 
multinational corporations. 
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The Choice of Stock Market 
Domestic Markets- SHSE and SZSE 
The domestic market is young and fast-growing, it is ranked by the World 
Bank in the Emerging Stock Market Statistics Report 1997 (1997 年新股票市場统 
計孝艮告)as the 5^ fast-growing market at 89% growth rate. 
Table 3 
Shanghai Stock Exchange Market Data 
Shanghai Market |12/1990 |12/1991|12/1992 |12/1993 |12/1994 |12/1995 
No. of Listed Companies  
_ |A-shares 7 7 29" 101 169 m 
B-shares — - - — 8 22 34 "36 
Total Cap, (billion RMB) “ 1.25 2.92 71.5 218.8 259.7 一 252.6 
GrowthRate 134% 2349% 206% 19% ~ ~ -5% 
|A-shares 1.25 2.92 67.9 206.8" 248.1 — 243.4 
|B-shares - - 3.6丨 12| 11.6丨 ^ 2 
500比6:莫文光杨瑞辉，中国证券市场透视，中文大学出版社，1997, p.29 
Table 4 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange Market Data 
Shenzhen Market |12/1990 |12/1991 |12/1992 |12/1993 |12/1994 |12/1995 
No. of Listed Companies  
|A-shares — 2 6 24 75 118. 127 
B-shares _ - - 9 ' 19 — 23 "34 
Total Cap, (billion RMB) 1.86— 8.08 47.5 1333 104.6 94.4 
GrowthRate — — 334% 488% 181% -22% -10% 
|A-shares — 1.86 8.08 44.4 T ^ ^ S f 2 
|B-shares - - 3.l| 8.4| 6.2! 7.2 
5 0饥0 6:莫文光杨瑞禪，中国证券市场透礼中文大学出版社，1 9 9 7 , p. 29 
However, compared to the mature Hong Kong and foreign market, the PRC 
market is still much behind. 
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The Problems ofDomestic Market 
Problems with A-shares listing 
As an emerging market, the PRC stock market is characterized as speculative 
and lack ofpotent regulative framework. The wide market fluctuation is appeared 
from the sharp rise and falls ofthe SZSE in 1990 and the disturbances of the SHSE in 
1992. In 1994, the difference between the high and low of the market indices of SHSE 
was 3.1 times and that ofthe SZSE was 2.4 times. As for the daily trading volume, the 
difference exceeded 100 times. 
The problems exist in the market though the government is working on to 
widen the base of investors and listing companies to promote stability. 
Market dominated by individual investors 
The market is young and small; the institutional investors have yet to emerge 
and the pension funds and insurance companies have yet to enter the market, 
therefore, the shareholders are scattered and the structure ofmarket supply and 
demand is not rational. 
Individual investors are irrational 
The investors are not sophisticated and highly sensitive to the price movement� 
Their price expectations are largely formulated from the historical price movement, 
the change in government policies and "insiders' information" (maybe rumours), 
rather than from the economic factors, company performance, and other rational 
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factors. They have lower tolerance to uncertainties and large group influences. The 
price and performance is not hooked up. 
Table 5 
Shanghai Stock Exchange-Investor Profile by Age 
Age Group No.of persons ('000) 
^ 2,675.03 
3 0 - 4 0 3,766.83~~ 
4 0 - 5 0 2,645.13~~ 




Shanghai Stock Exchange -Investors Profile by Age 
4,000,000 ^ 30 ~ 40 years old 
3,500,000 — ^ I 
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Figure 1. Shanghai Stock Exchange -Investors Profile by Age 
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Table 11 
Shanghai Stock Exchange- Investor Profile by Academic Background 
Education level |No.of persons ( ' 0 0 ^ 
< Secondary 3,928.04 一 
Secondary “ 1,177.05 
Post Secondary~ 2,081.69 
Bachelor 888.67 一 
Master & above 376.95 
Other 3,547.60 一 
^0虹06:上海证券交易所统计年鉴，1997，pl53 
Shanghai Stock Exchange - Investors Profile by Academic Background 
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1.000,000 - . '_ 圖 圓 
500,000 - 邏 邏 國 邏 „ ^ 
”• ^M ^ S ^^¾ ^ H 
- • ] 1 '*^^ 1 tTMM 1 ™™™ 1 "“™ 1 '^™™ 1 1 
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Figure 2 Shanghai Stock Exchange - Investors Profile by Academic Background 
Speculative market 
Compared to the more sophisticated market whose annual average turnover 
rate are normally below 30%. According to the market capitalization RMB 329bn at 
the end of 1995, the transaction volume was RMB 403bn, the turnover rate was as 
high as 120%. Since approx. 85% of the shares are state shares and legal person 
shares, the actual transaction rate was higher than 600%. 
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Table 11 
The Trading Volume of China Stock Market in 1995 
~~Trade Volume in 1995~~ Compare to 1994 
RMB (billion) (%) 
Shanghai Stock Exchange 310.35 -45.88 
— B Share 6.09 -43.84 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange 93.24 _61.41 
B Share 1.70 5.19 
— Q t a l 403.59 - 50.34 
s o u r c e : 中国股票市场的发展’中国证券市 4透视， l " l p . 7 9 ‘ 
Government intervention 
The market fluctuated along with the announcement of government policies. 
The market went bearish for a long time in 1993 when the government announced the 
macroeconomic control policies. In Julyl994, the market rocketed when the three 
rescue policies were announced. In five working days, the SZSE grew 67% and SHSE 
grew 105.1%� 
Quota system for listing 
The central government controls the quota for listing companies. The 
companies and regional governments are not putting their effort is improving 
performance but to compete in improper ways for the quota. 
Table 8 
The allocation of quota ofpublic shares in 1993 Q^MB miL) 
Area Quota Area Quota Area Quota 
Beijing 100" Henan 100 "Wuhan 50" 
Tianjin 100 "Wubei 100 Guangzhou 100— 
Hebei 100 Wunan 100 Dalian 可 
Shanxi 50 "Guangdong — 250 Shenyang 50 
Neimenggu 50 Guangxi 5 ^ Qingdao 50 
Liaoning 50 Sanxi 100 Nanjing 50 
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Area Quota Area Quota Area Quota 
Jilin 100 "Ningxia — 30 Ningbo 50— 
H e i l o n g j i a n ^ 100 Gansu 50 Xiamen 50 
“Shandong — 150 “ Chinghai — 30 "Chengdu 50 
_ Shanghai 400 “ Xinjiang — 50 l i a n W 
Jiangsu 150— Sichuan 1Q0" Harbin 50 
Anhui 100" Guizhou 50" Chongqing 50 
Zhechiang 1Q0" Yunnan 50 Shenzhen — 300 
Jiangxi 100 Xizhang 30" Changchun — 50 
Fujian 200 ^ i n a n 100 H sh^e enterprise 1857 
Total 5877' 
s o u r c e :证券买卖及海外发行和上市的监管，中国证券市场透视， 1 9 9 7 , p . 2 2 ! 
Limited Industrial Coverage 
Due to the quota control, the government has the power to 
encourage/discourage the listing of companies of certain industrial background. Most 
ofthe listing companies had been heavy industrial industries and most are state-
owned enterprise. 
Table 9 
Number ofListed Companies and Turnover ofStock Exchanges in PRC 
National Total Shanghai Stock Exchange Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
No. oflisted|~~Turnover No. oflisted ~~Turnover No. oflisted ~ ~ T u m o v e r “ 
Classification po. R M B Q x ) companies RMBQ?.) companies RMB(b.) 
Industrials 183 2,478.81 109 1,943.85 74 534.96 
Commerce 45— 453.33 34 412.56 “ 11 40.77 ‘ 
Properties 26 331.67 9 212.11 17 119.56 
Finance 3 57.23 3 57.23 
Utilities 27 271.22 12 187.74 15 83.48 
CoDglomerIi[r 39 392.33— 24 295.37 “ 15 96.96 “ 
Total 323 3,975.59 188 3,042.63 135 932.96 
source: 1996中国^^^券监脅管理>^员会，中国证^|^期货统计年鉴,中国统计出版“，1996 
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Figure 3 Turnover of Shanghai Stock Exchange Total by Classification 
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Figure 4. Turnover ofNational Exchange Total by Classification 
Unregulated behavior 
The listed companies have no proper information disclosure and performance 
monitoring. The financial agencies are not regulated; fraudulence like deceiving 
customers, dishonest valuations, false certifications, inaccurate auditing, etc., are not 
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uncommon. The security firms involve in insider trading, spreading rumors, 
controlling share prices, etc. 
Credibility of the market 
Apart from the rumors of corruption (evident in the 8.10 incident in 
Shenzhen), the roles among the government regulatory bodies are not clearly defined 
and proper coordination is missing. 
High P/E ratio 
The average P/E ofdomestic market are higher than the international standard 
of 10 at which the market is worth investing. P/E larger than 10 is considered 
speculative market. However, the average P/E of SZSE is at 28 in 1996. The highest 
point was reached at Dec. 1996 at 55.5 times. The investors were highly irrational and 
had no concem ofthe high risks involved. 
Table 10 
V/E Ratios ofthe Shanghai Stock Market 
FfE Ratio 1996 1995 Change % 
Mean issued Shares 7939 2 ^ 294.58~~ 
AShare 79.78 30.54 261.23 
BShare 7 7 ^ ^ 422.37 
Weighted issued Shares 31.32 TJ77! 199.36~~ 
AShare 32.65 16.32 200.06 




Turnover rate ofthe Shanghai Stock Market 
— Turnover Rate 1996 | 1995 Change。/。一  
Issued Shares 
A Share 171.69 106.67 160.95 
B Share 6J_^ 5 ^ 109.46 
Negotiable Shares 
A Share 760.05 519.41 146.33 





Problems with B-shares listing 
Low market capitalization 
The small market capitalization reduced the investment interest for the 
institutional investors, like the funds, because the investment funds usually take up 
large orders that they would absorb most of the stock in the market on their entry。The 
market would not have enough liquidity for further trading. . 
Low liquidity 
Most ofthe B-shares were sold through private placement (私募)instead of 
public offering, there are only limited number offoreign investors and the trading 
volume is low. 
Quota system 
The quota for the new issue ofB-shares is also control b y the central 
government. The only difference is that they are allocated to the securities managing 
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departments instead ofdown to provincial government and the industry-related 
government departments as in A-shares' case. 
Inconvenient and time-consuming transactions 
Since the B-shares are traded on domestic market (SZSE and SHSE), the 
foreign investors would have to go through their local agents to contact the brokers in 
PRC and then place the transaction for matching. The results are passed in the reverse 
direction back to the foreign investors. The whole process is costly and time-
consuming. 
Poor information access 
Though the market o f A and B-shares are divided, there are still general trends 
that the price ofB-shares are influence by that ofA-shares. 
Due to the remoteness ofthe market, it is hard for foreign investors to receive 
first hand information about their stocks. 
Poor market infrastructure 
Both the physical establishments like the clearing system and the regulatory 
system and market management have yet to meet international standard, which 
reduced the foreign investors' incentives to take up B-shares. 
Overseas Market 一 N-shares and H-shares 
Compared to the domestic markets, the overseas markets ( both in Hong Kong 
and other countries ) provides a more dynamic yet regulated trading environment. 
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Large market capitalization and High liquidity 
They are able to support SOEs with larger capital needs, for example, 
Shanghai Petrochemical's global offering to issue 1.68b H-shares to Hong Kong, US 
and European investors，which even Hong Kong market alone could not well 
accommodate. The size ofthe market also means the high trading volume and 
liquidity. 
Multiple channels for investors 
Apart from the individual investors, there are large number ofinstitution and 
long-term investors from various backgrounds. The more sophisticated investors 
makes the markets a less speculative one than that ofthe domestic ones. 
High degree of internationalization 
High degree of internationalization brings not only reputation ofbeing a world 
class company, but also open up the opportunities of international business 
cooperation. Many overseas listing companies entered into sino-foreignjoint ventures 
after listing. 
Strict listing requirement and highlv regulated Environment 
With much longer history and internationalization, the security legal 
infrastructure is much more complete and comprehensive than that ofthe domestic 
ones. With better regulations, the risk of illegal practices is relatively suppressed. The 
strict listing requirements help raise the status oflisted companies, which would in 
terms increase their credibility and reputation among the other SOEs 
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Widen sources offinancing 
The success in listing in overseas market implied that the company has been 
able to complied with highest degree of regulatory requirement in going public，which 
would give them a better position in subsequent applications ofA-share listing and 
bank financing. 
Tax and other benefit 
According to the law in PRC, the company would be considered a foreign 
joint-venture company ifforeign investors own 25% or more ofits share. It would be 
able to enjoy the income tax benefit, and at the same time gain greater autonomy in 
the export and domestic sales, management and marketing etc. Through listing as H-
shares, the company has to have a minimum of 25% shares on float, which makes it 
qualifies to be considered asjoint venture. 
Table 12 
Comparisons of the four ways ( as below) ofoverseas Usting 
Market H K S E N Y S E H K S E + N Y S E H K S E (Global) 
Reputation " m j h “ Very high Very high High  
Liquidity " ^ h “ Very high Very high High  
Market Cap. 3 ^ 4,300bn 4,600bn 13,000bn 
QJS $) 
Lavestors mainly Asian — Global Giobal Global  
M b . Disclosure~~ H K S E SlC | H K S E + SEC H K S E 
Requirements  
Accounting p A S U S G A A P IAS + U S G A A P L\S 
Standard  
Examples 廣州造船 華能公司 上海石化 鞍山鋼鐵 
音息碑酒 中國輪船 儀征化纖  
Time Req. Fastest | + 6 to 10 weeks +6tolOweeks +2weeks  
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Comparing the four ways of overseas listing used by the PRC enterprises, 
listing in Hong Kong is the fastest means, the market capitalization and liquidity are 
high yet not as high as the listing in NYSE, or other Global Offering. The Global 
listing ofH-shares gives the greatest exposure to the company in terms ofthe number 
oftheir potential investors, liquidity and market capitalization, yet it also takes the 
longest time. 
Compare to HKSE，HKSE(Global) and the listing in NYSE ( NYSE or HKSE 
+ NYSE), having the listing status inNYSE gives the companies high reputation for 
the compliance ofthe listing and accounting standard ofthe US market. 
Hong Kong Market ^I-shares) 
Between the choice oflisting in domestic market, other countries and Hong 
Kong stock market, Hong Kong has its own competitive advantages. 
International funds 
Hong Kong is the sixth largest capital market in the world by market 
capitalization and the international fmancial center. She has no control in the currency 
conversion and attractive low taxes. She has been able to attract investment from all 
over the world that most of the international financial institutions have their 
representatives in Hong Kong. Listing in Hong Kong is an opportunity to tap the 
international capital market. 
In the case of global issue ofH-shares of Shanghai Petrochemical, it has been able to 
gain investment from Hong Kong, US and the European investors. 
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High liquidity, high trading voliime and efficiency 
The large capitalization and diversified background of the listing companies 
and investors maintain a good balance for Hong Kong market that it has high liquidity 
and trading volume. 
Due to the close links ofHong Kong and China in geographical and 
cultural background, the investors in Hong Kong have great interest and boarder 
knowledge ofthe China market. Not to mention the fact the research analysts with 
China focus are abundant in Hong Kong, and the Hong Kong market have put up 
indices for H-shares and red-chips to facilitate trading, the transactions volume ofH-
shares are undoubtedly high. 
An efficient and well-regulated Market 
Hong Kong is a well-established and regulated market with the independent 
regulating bodies, like the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, etc. The legal frameworks are 
well practiced. 
Listing in Hong Kong required internationally accepted high standard, the 
listing status gain confidence ofthe foreign investors in putting their capital in the 
stocks of the SOEs. 
Besides, the market has put effort in ensuring the minority shareholders 
interests and increasing the transparency ofmanagement for the H-shares companies. 
Common cultural background 
Hong Kong and china have a common culture and language. People have 
common understanding ofcertain problems in the SOEs and better comprehend the 
Chinese business practices. 
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CHAPTER JV 
THE PROCEDURE FOR H-SHARE LISTEVG 
The process for H-share listing for a PRC enterprise comprises of two stages as 
described in the figure below. 
In the Stage (I), the enterprise has to file application for the listing quota 
which is jointly set by the China Security Regulatory Commission (国家证券 
委员会）and the State Planning Committee (国家计划委员会) .S ince the quota is 
very limited and unevenly distributed among the provinces, industrial management 
agencies, other regional government agencies, it is crucial to have effective access to 
the distributing bodies and obtain a quota. 
After approval for the listing quota, the enterprise has to go through a long and 
difficult process offormation ofthe eventual listing company. Thesupervisory 
government agency and the enterprise have to formulate a plan for its restructuring of 
the ownership structure, assets and liabilities, and the management and personal 
arrangement, etc. 
The actual restructuring is then taken placed which usually involved the 
redistribution ofpower and resources and the elimination ofexisting interest and 
benefits. It too often amounts to the serious conflict of interest among the local and 
central government authorities, the senior management, and even among the 
management and the workers themselves, etc.. The whole process can take up to one 
year. 
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There are still much works left for the professional accountants and legal 
agencies in the valuation ofassets and liabilities, auditing and the acquiring ofland 
use rights, etc.. The enterprise then have to get approval from the PRC State 
Commission for Restructuring of the Economic System and register as ofthejoint 
stock limited company (the listing company). 
In the State (II), thelisting company commences preparation ofthe listing 
documents, like the prospectus and other documents required by the security 
regulatory agencies. The materials are submitted to the regional security regulatory 
agencies for primary approval and then to the China Security Regulatory Commission 
for further approval. Meanwhile, the company has submit the listing document to 
apply for the permission for listing from the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. 
After the receiving all the approvals, the company would hold an Extra-
ordinary General Meeting for alteration of the Memorandum and the Company 
Articles to adjust for the changes to listing status and the publication ofthe company 
prospectus. 
At length, the company prospectus is issued to the public and the company 
conducts promotion propaganda for the primary offering. The stock ofthe company is 
offered to the institution investors through placing and to the public through public 
offering. The stock is traded in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange as a H-share. 
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Formation of Companv Limited for Listing 
Restructuring 
The restructuring ofthe enterprises, usually SOEs, is to reorganize the related 
business under the company, clarify the ownership structure, align with international 
accounting and reporting system, to form the limited company to be listed. 
This is the most important, complicate and time-taking task in the course of 
getting listed. It involves professionals from the valuation agencies, the major 
underwriter, legal agencies, accountancies, and different departments from the 
enterprise. 
The Obiectives 
Clarify ownership structure 
To reestablish and reduce the complication among the relationship ofthe state, 
the supervisory government department, the holding company and the listing 
company and so as to reduce the risks perceived by the investors. 
37 
Organize related business 
The enterprise may attempt to strengthen its core business and avoid 
competition ( conflict ofinterest) with the listing company through the grouping up 
of the related business under the company, or through acquisition of those businesses� 
Improve management structure 
It is the separation ofthe role ofabusiness enterprise from that ofthe social 
benefit providers： They have to rearrange their original management structure, 
including moving the social benefit facilities, like hospitals, school, etc., away from 
the new company. 
Improve financial management 
They may have to improve their asset and debt position to increase the 
attractiveness ofthe listing company to the investors, especially, those with heavy 
"triangular debt". 
International alignment 
There aremany differences between the PRC accounting and legal systems 
and those ofthe international ones. They company would have to be able to confine 
with the international standard offmancial reporting. Usually, they would not hold 
two different sets ofbooks, rather, they would adjust their existing accounting reports 




1. Select listing assets and liability 
2. Redefine ownership structure 
3. Valuation of assets 
4. Obtain government approval 
Forms ofRestructuring 
Among the 39 H share companies listed, we found that there are mainly four 
types of restructuring. They are 
I. The Single Enterprise Structure 
II. The Transformation Structure 
III. The Group Holding Structure 
IV. The Spin Off Structure 
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Type I. The Single Enterprise Structure 
The whole enterprise is restructured. This involves the total input of the assets 
ofthe original enterprise into the listing company and the intake offurther capital 
from public listing. This type ofrestructuring happens in the enterprise that is more 
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Figure 6. Type I Restructuring-The Single Enterprise Structure 
Typical examples o f H share companies which undertook restructuring by the 
Single Enterprise Structure is tabulated below. 
Table 13 
Restructuring ofH-shares Companies by the Single Enterprise Structure 
Sichuan Expressway 四川成涂高速公路股份有限公司 
Tsingdao Brewery _青島吟酒股份有限公司 — 
Jiangsu Expressway ~ "江蘇寧濃高速公路股份有限公司 ~ " 
Shenzhen Expressway 深圳高速公路股份有限公司 _ 
Zhenhai Refining & Chemical 鎮海煉油化工股份有限公司 
Chengdu Telecommunications Cable 成都電境股份有限公司 
40 
Case Example: Chengdu Telecommunications Gable Co. Ltd. 
ps=S55SS5S5=H=|| Chengdu 
Chengdu Telecom. 
Telecom. Cable Co, Ltd. 
Cable Factory Restructoe Listed 
/"""^"^^ i^^ iiilPN^ 1/ ^<^"^"^i^^iiiir^ 
Chengdu's ) ^ ( Chengdu's 
V,^^J^siness^^ N > ^ ^ s i n e s s ^ 
Figure 7. Case Example ofChengdu Telecommunications Cable Co. Ltd. 
The case for Chengdu is typicai and straight forward. The Chengdu Telecom� 
Cable Factory, as the sole promoter, setup the Chengdu Telecom. Cable Co。，Ltd. 
Afterwards, Chengdu Telecom. Cable Co., Ltd. receive all the assets and liabilities 
from the original Chengdu Telecom. Cable Factory. 
After going through all the procedures required for listing in the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange, Chengdu Telecom, was successfuly listed on Dec 1994. 
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Type II. The Transformation Structure 
The second type ofrestructuring will result in disappearing of the original 
SOE whereby two new legal entities are set up. One legal entity to be listed contain 
certain business from the original SOE and another legal entity not going to list 
contain the rest ofthe business from the same original SOE. 
^ State 
Owner Q ^ r 
Original r e s t r u c t u � LegalEntity LegalEntity 
SOE " > to be NOT 
| L _ ^ ^ ^ ^ J LISTED to list 
CBusiness B u s i n e s s ^ ( B u s i n e s s � ( Business A 
^ i _ L 3 ^ v ^ y v I ^ 
^ Before Restructuring After 
Restructuring 
Figure 8. Type n Restructuring- The Transformation Structure 
So far, we find one example o f H share company who take the Transformation 
into two new Legal entities Structure, for restructuring. The company we found was, 
Table 14 
Restructuring ofH-shares Companies by the Transformation Structure 
Shanghai Petrochemical | 上海石油化工股份有限公司一 
Case Example: Please refer to chapter 'Case : Shanghai Petrochemical' for the 
description of the restructuring. 
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Type III. The Group Holding Structure 
In addition to the setting up ofholding company and separation of the original 
businesses intro two separate legal entities which are hold by the original enterprise, 
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SOE ^ Company 
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Figure 9. Type III Restructuring- The Group Holding Structure 
One kind ofoperation mainly focuses on the separation ofproductive parts 
and non-productive parts where the productive parts will be listed. Usually, the 
productive part will be listed and the holding company (original SOE) will hold the 
non-productive part by means of a separate legal entity. 
Another kind ofoperation focuses on combining major field(s) ofbusiness 
from the parent company to be listed, which include the asset, the liability and the 
responsibility to provide certain social welfare. 
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The third kind ofrestructuring has been mostly adopted by the H share 
companies. Examples of companies who take the third type of restructuring is 
tabulated below, 
Table 15 
Restructuring ofH-shares Companies by the Transformation Structure 
First Tractor 第一拖拉機股份有限公司 ~ ~ " 
T^ojtheast m e e t n e a ^ i r = m i s s i a n 北 输 變 電 機 械 制 造 股 份 
& Transformation Machinery 有限公司 
Manufacturing  
CATIC Shenzhen Holdings 深圳中航實業股份有限公司 一 
Kunming Machine Tool 昆明機床股份有限公司 一 
MaanshanIron&Steei 馬鞍山鋼鐵股份有限公司 
Beijing YanhuaPetrochemical 北京燕化石油化工股份有限公司 
Angang New Steel 鞍鋼新軋鋼股份有限公司 _ 
Jilin Chemical Industrial 吉林化學工業股份有限公司 
Guangshen Railway " ^ ¾ 鐵路股份有限公司 
BeijingNorthStar -北辰實業股份有限公司 
Nanjing PandaElectronics 南京熊 _電子股份有限公司 
Zhejiang Expressway 浙江滚杭沉高速股份有限公司 
ChinaEastemAirlines 中國東方航空股份有限公司 
Shandong Xinhua Pharmaceutical 山東新華制禁股份有限公司 一 
Guangzhou Pharmaceutical 廣州禁業股份有限公司 _ 
Anhui Conch 安徽海螺水泥股份有限公司 一 
Beijing Datang Power Generation 北京大唐發電股份有限公司 
Anhui Expressway 安徽院通高速公路股份有限公司 
Yizheng Chemical Fibre 儀征化纖股份有限公司 
ChongQing Iron 一重慶鋼鐵股份有限公司 
China Southern Airlines 中國南方航空股份有限公司 
" : ~ ~ r ~ r T T T ~ ~ r T 7 T " 天 津 勃 海 化 工 （ 票 團 ） 
Tianjm Bohai Chemical Industry 股份有限公司 
Dongfang Electrical M a c h i n e r y ~ ~東方電機股份有限公司 — 
Luoyang Glass 洛陽玻璃股份有限公司 
Qingling Motors 慶铃汽車股份有限公司 一 
Harbin Power Equipment 哈爾濱動力設備股份有限公司 
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Case Example: Beijing North Star 
Beijing North Star 
Group 
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Figure 10. Case Example ofthe Beijing North Star Co. Ltd. 
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Example (cont.)： Beijing North Star 
As shown in the exhibit, the Beijing North Star Group originally had six 
businesses. In preparation ofthe listing, the company chose the most profitable and 
heaviest weight ofbusiness - property investment and development, to be listed. 
Initially, the exhibition and tour business had business like exhibition center and 
hotel. While the property business dealt with the residential real estate development� 
Apart from the two business units, the shopping arcade from the trading business was 
also transferred to the newly established company - Beijing North Star Co., Ltd. 
The most difficult part ofrestructuring to be accepted by the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange was the renting ofland use right instead ofthe ownership ofland 
asset. Although this practice is not new for other H share company, the main concern 
is that land asset for factory is not the major value of other industrial company and 
North Star, as a property company has much depend on the value ofthe land. 
Since North Star only uses the land as investment property, not selling the 
property that involves the change ofownership, therefore, this difficulty has fmally 
been solved. In the other hand, North Star has this arrangement considering that the 
value ofland worth RMB 1.7 billion, if included in the company to be listed, will 
dilute the per share interest in the company for the prospective shareholder. The 
overall attractiveness of the company for the investors would be reduced. 
Regarding the arrangement ofemployee, North Star adopted the principal that 
"the worker follow the business". Either, employee who used to work in exhibition 
center will for the listed company while employee who used to work in the trading 
unit continue to work for the trading unit as a subsidiary of the holding company of 
the listed company. Retired and laid off workers were treated with a lump sum 
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payment as small amount connected transaction. Other services provided by the 
parent company to the listed company were recorded as connected transaction. 
At last, North Star successfully listed in May 1997 with over-subscription rate 
of about 400 times. 
Type IV. The Spin OffStructure 
The fourth kind ofrestructuring focus on the separation ofbusiness to 
be spin offfrom the original SOE. However, no holding company is set up and the 
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Figure 11. Type TV Restructuring-The Spin Off Structure 
We found that there are two H share companies which take this type of 
restructuring. 
Table 16 
Restructuring ofH-shares Companies by Spin OffStructure 
"57angzhou Shipyard International 廣州廣船國際股份有限公司—  
"15Tgwei Textile Machinery 經緯訪織機械股份有限公司— 
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Figure 12. Case Example ofGuangzhou Shipyard International Co. Ltd. 
For Guangzhou Shipyard, he has prior to restructuring, decide the separation 
offactories and subsidiaries from non-business service units and non-shipyard core 
business. The factories and subsidiaries are transferred to the newly established 
Guangzhou Shipyard International. All other not transferred business as well as asset 
and liability will be retained by the original Guangzhou Shipyard. 
Finally, when Guangzhou Shipyard International passed through all the listing 
requirements, he become successfully listed in 1993. 
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The Structure After Listing 
State Owner 1 Legal Person 1 丨 Employee | PublicH 
A-shares i A-shares 丨 丨 Sha reASh .丨 shareholder 
H Share listed 
C o m p a n y 
!^^^^^ L i s t e d ^ N 
1 SOEs ) 
Figure 13. S t ruc ture After Listing 
Finally, no matter what type ofrestmcturing that the SOE has undergone, 
there is only one final form after listing, which is shown in the following figure. 
From the above figure, we can see that the H share listed company has at least 
two owners, the State Owner who hold non-transferable state share and the Public H 
share holder who can buy and sell their share in the stock exchange. The existence of 
legal person and employee share depend on the arrangement ofthe H share enterprise 
to be listed. Not every H share listed company has either or both the legal person and 
employee share. 
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Frequency Distribution of the State Share only and 
State Share with Legal Share 
> 
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Figure 14. Frequency Distribution ofthe State Share only and State Share with Legal Share 
The above graph is the distribution of state share and state share with legal 
share together for 33^ out ofthe 39 H share companies. From the graph above, we 
can observe that the State remains to be the major shareholder. The State has strong 
interest in the enterprise and retain the power to influence the decision making ofthe 
enterprise. 
Employee share 
The introduction ofthe employee share has some strategic flmction in 
transferring the burden ofthe enterprise in providing the social benefit to the worker 
back to the worker. 
3 33 companies were selected for study instead of39 because of the limitation in getting all the data. 
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In our study, we found that there are two methods in decreasing the burden of 
providing social benefit by the enterprise. First, the enterprise wouldjoin the social 
insurance plan of the local government which resemble the Central Pension Fund 
(CPF) of Singapore. Whereby, the enterprise a portion for the employee and the 
employee pay for themselves. When retired, the worker can get the retirement fund 
from the insurance plan. Second, the enterprise can arrange employee share, which 
would be limited transferable for non-A share listed H share company. In some cases, 
when the H share company become listed as in Shanghai or Shenzhen, the company 
convert the employee share into public A share. 
Some advantages in having employee share is described below, 
Advantages of having employee share  
• As an incentive system to let the employee to take active roles, to release their 
potential and use their talent and try to remedy the past weakness 
• Change the capital structure by raising some fund and may be used to pay back 
bank loan 
• Free the enterprise to some extent from heavily subsidizing the employee 
• Stabilize the emotion of the employee, solve the problem of 'employed j obless, 
在 岗 失 业 . . 
• When one day the government is separated from the enterprises, let the enterprise 
become self-administrative by the employee 
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The Central Issues in Restructuring 
The central issue involved in the restructuring to increase the efficiency and 
profitability of the SOEs through 
• Reestablishing the ownership relationship with the government (理力頃產權) 
• The separation of power of the government from the enterprise management 
(政企分立） 
• The removal of three burdens, 
1. the social security burden (企業辦社會包祇 ) 
2. the redundant personnel (冗員包祇 ) 
3. the burden ofheavy debt (債務包祇） 
• Establish modem management and monitoring system 
(現代化的管理及監察制度） 
• Grouping the related and productive assets to raise fund for farther 
development 
On the other hand, the whole process is long and difficult; it touches upon the 
deep-rooted interest network and the traditional mind-set of the people, which impose 
great pressure and resistance on any changes to be taken part. 
Even though the restructuring is carried out, there are fundamental issues that 
remain in the ownership management structure that makes up the loopholes for any 
malfunctioning of the power-holders. Whether the structure would be able to work as 
it intended is also an issue. 
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The Role of Supervisory Government Department /the Parent Holding Company 
-the Separation of Governmental Influences from 
the Enterprises Management 
Under Central Economic in planning 
• The SOEs are controlled by the related government department who would act 
according to the policy of the central government and give executive orders to 
the SOEs as how they should manage their business and company. 
After the Restructuring 
• In most ofthe case, the SOEs themselves become the holding companies of 
the listed companies. Most of the major executives in the organelle SOEs sit in 
the board of directors of the new listed companies. 
• For the holding companies, they are still controlled by the government 
department. 
• The original idea ofbecoming a listed company and restructuring is to 
eliminate the fundamental mechanism for the government to intervene into the 
business management of the SOEs. 
State Shares cannot float 
However, because of the majority state shares are not allowed to float, the 
state main the absolute majority shareholders in the listed company, that is, there is 
not significant balancing voices from the outsiders in the board of directors. The 
board ofdirector and thus the eventual control of the company is still in the hand of 
the more or less the same group ofpeople. 
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The changes power controlling structure compared to how it is before is not 
much different, i.e. only a different expression for the same idea. 
However, the eventual separation of the government from the enterprises is 
achieved to a certain degree though the active staying-out of the government. The 
board ofdirectors of the listed company, though be the same group ofpeople as 
before in the SOEs, are given more autonomy in the management of the company. 
The state control is shifted from actively intervening to looking after the performances 
and leaving along how it is done. 
To sum up，it is not (not before the state shares are floated) yet in the 
fundamental structuring and mechanism that the government is "staying out o f the 
business" through inviting other voices into the board ofdirectors. 
The government can still acting as the ONLY significant share-holders 
(unchallenged status ) intervene the business through the appointment o f the board of 
directors i f i t wishes (as there is not much significant other minor shareholders 
influencing the board ). Further diversify ownership and grant the enterprises more 
power should be a priority. 
The Role of SOEs as the Social Welfare Agents 
-The Removal of the Social Welfare Burden and 
the Redundant Personnel Burden 
The enterprise serving as a little society (企業辦社會）and the redundant 
personnel are two major burdens troubling most, ifnot all, ofthe SOEs. 
Restructuring accelerates the transfer of social obligations such as housing, 
education, and pensions to local government and the employees themselves. It would 
be difficult to liquidate, sell, merge, or restructure enterprises if the SOEs were still 
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required to meet these obligations. Some local governments have tried to establish 
pension pools, which included funds from both the enterprise and the local 
government. Housing subsidies have also been reduced significantly by either raising 
rents and wages simultaneously or by selling property rights to tenants. 
Roles of the Communist Party and Employee Organizations 
in the listed company 
Entangled relationship with potential conflicts ofinterest (power) 
Two nucleus Vs the General Manager 
Traditionally, The SOEs were controlled by Two Nucleus: 
• Production management: Factory manager (廠長) 
• Political control: communist party committee secretary 
( 黨 委 書 記 ) 
After the reform, the management control is centered One Person: 
• General manager 
Three committees and Three Organization 
Traditionally, there are ‘‘ Three committees" in the SOEs: 
1. Enterprise communist party committee (企業黨 # 會) 
It is responsible for the aligning of the political mind-set of the workers to 
keep their thinking align with the direction of the communist party. 
2. Employee representative committee (職工代表大會) 
It is responsible to participate in the management decision-making . 
3. Labor unions (工會) 
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It is responsible for the bargaining with the management for reasonable 
welfare for the workers. However, usually, their bargaining power is not 
material. • 
The role ofemployee representative committee and the labor unions are very 
repetitive. 
After the restructuring, there are “ Three New Committees": 
1. Annual General Meeting 
It consists of the shareholders. The government representative is the major but 
not only shareholders. 
2. Board of directors 
It is appointed by the shareholders, but usually appointed from the original 
management team. 
3. Supervisory Committee (監事會) 
It is selected by the shareholders from the employee to monitor the directors 
and the management. There must be workers' representative in the 
Committee. 
Moving towards share-holding system (股份制）also implied the separation 
of the power ofthe communist party from the management ofthe enterprises, which 
may results in the raise of power in the production management to the political control 
of the party committee secretary. The problems may not be obvious for the enterprise 
with both roles served by single person. However, for those with different persons, the 
deprivation ofleading power in either party may impose conflicts and resistance to 
change. 
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To most of the listed SOEs, the restructuring may reduce the influence of the 
political party to the decision making of the enterprise. But most o f the party 
personnel remain in key position in the enterprise, as directors in the company. The 
question remains is how influential the party is still to the enterprise? 
Traditionally, the labor accepted what the Party and the Government 
instructed. The role ofbalancing the interest oflabor and the owners of the enterprise 
is not significant, since the Government is supplying welfare to the labor through the 
enterprise. 
Under the new system, the shareholders' interest may not be in line with that 
of the labor, as represented by the two labor organizations, which may results in 
potential conflicts. The two labor organizations, the employee representative 
committee and the labor union, are in the role ofbalancing the power of the 
shareholders, the board of directors. 
However, in reality, the situation seems more collaborative than competitive. 
The Supervisory Committee usually has members from the leaders of the two labor 
organizations. The directors, who are in direct control of the management are loosely 
controlled by the majority shareholders (the state), are themselves, in most of the case, 
having their compensation ( salary ) linked to that of the labor's. After all，they 
themselves are part of the employee. 
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CHAPTER VI 
ISSUES AND DIFFICULTIS IN LISTING 
The listing o f H share is strongly supported by the government as we can see 
that the total time spent in the preparation oflisting, including going through the 
tedious steps in the government, has been less than six months for Beijing Yanhua 
Petrochemical and four months only for North Star. However, those H share 
companies experienced many problems that they need to solve. 
In order to realize the real situation, we have visited Beijing North Star in 
Beijing, PRC during February 1998 for interview and conducted Fax interviews with 
other H shares companies quoted hereinafter. The content that we described in the 
text is based on the interviews. 
Quota System 
The prerequisite to be listed, whether in Shanghai, Shenzhen or Hong Kong, is 
to get a quota from the government. At the moment, the government gives favor to 
the heavy industries and infrastructure developments to be listed in Hong Kong. Of 
the 39 H share companies already listed in Hong Kong, they were given the quota in 
four batches. 
The disadvantage of quota system is that if a SOE cannot get a quota, they 
cannot be listed and may miss the chance of raising fund at the right time which affect 
the development of the enterprise. 
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Answering the Questions of HKSE 
During the evaluation of an application for H share listing, the HKSE will ask 
a lot of questions and the number of questions in the order ofhundred. According to 
North Star, although not every question is tricky and good question, the HKSE has 
been very careful for every detail. 
Restructuring 
Unclear Company Structure and Ownership 
Some H share companies have a lot of subsidiaries before restructuring. 
While the structure and ownership of the group of companies is complicated and the 
company has to selectively choose some or part ofthe subsidiaries for listing by 
merging and spinning off. This has contributed to the difficulty of the restructuring. 
Typical examples are Guangzhou Shipyard International and Jingwei Textile 
Machinery. 
Dependence on Parent Company 
In most of the cases, H share companies have very close business relation with 
the parent company. This is understandable since some of the H share companies are 
formed by one or some subsidiaries of the parent company. The dependence refer to 
the connected transaction whereby the sales or input of the company come mainly 
from the parent company. For example, the Shanghai Petrochemical has the major 
material - crude oil supplied mainly by the parent company. Such practices will 
inevitably hinder the dependent operation and profitability ofthe enterprise. 
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Selection ofBusiness To Avoid Competition with the Parent Company 
The selection ofbusiness for the company to be listed should be avoided from 
having competition with the parent company or the HKSE will regard the company as 
unsuitable for listing. Therefore, SOEs has to select the business units of similar 
nature from different department and restructure to form the new company. 
Social Burden 
The tradition of'the enterprise runs the society' had introduced the heavy 
dependence of the worker on the enterprise for the providing of social welfare such as 
housing, education, medical services, etc. 
The providing of the social benefit to the worker is not favored by the 
investors because this practice will directly reduce the benefit obtainable from the 
enterprise. During the restructuring, if the enterprise did not transfer the obligation of 
providing to the parent company, the enterprise would spin off the management of the 
social benefit by joining the insurance plan provided by the local government. The 
payment of the insurance plan are shared by the enterprise and the employees. 
Furthermore, by the adoption of employees share, the enterprise provide less 
and less social benefit to their workers. 
Handling of Debt 
The handling of debt like bad debt allowance and triangle debt is discussed 
under the subpart of 'Accounting System’. 
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Accounting System 
Before listing, the financial reports of SOEs are usually not audited by 
independent chartered accountant. With the listing o f H share, those companies 
should have their accounting report audited by professional accounting firm and also 
prepare two accounting statements. One accounting statements according to the Hong 
Kong Accounting Standard and another according to the PRC requirement. 
According to North Star, the most difficult matter in accounting should be the 
evaluation of asset. Particularly, typical problems between the two accounting 
systems are the evaluation ofFixed Asset, cost of inventory and bad debt allowance� 
Fixed Asset 
The determination oflifetime and depreciation method is different for the two 
accounting systems. 
Cost of Inventory 
While the PRC accounting practice record the actual cost of inventory without 
any adjustment in the changes of current value of the inventories. The Hong Kong 
accounting practice use the lower value of either the actual cost of inventories and the 
current value, and require the subtraction from the profit if the current value of the 
inventories have been reduced. 
Bad Debt Allowances 
If the account receivable is deemed to be not recoverable, Hong Kong 
accounting practice has to treat those account receivable as bad debt. However, in 
PRC, the realization ofbad debts has to be met with the three conditions set by the 
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government. The three conditions are (i) the account receivable has last for three 
years, (ii) the debtor has gone bankrupt and (iii) the legacy of deceased debtor cannot 
pay off all the debt, respectively. 
Since the SOEs lack the experience in cooperating with the foreign accountant 
in auditing and do not realize the rationale for the acquiring of some data and 
information, the auditingjob cannot be done appropriately. After the listing, the 
accounting department of the enterprise will be heavily loaded in responding to both 
the requirement ofPRC and Hong Kong stock market. 
Triangle Debt 
Triangle debt is famous among the SOEs and is observable as huge accounting 
payable and accounting receivable on the balance sheet. According to the 
International Accounting Practice, aged account receivable should be treated with bad 
debt allowance, therefore the profit of those companies become smaller. 
Despite the arrangement of account receivable with the bad debt allowance, 
the company going to be listed has problem with the huge account payable and 
receivable. On one hand, investors would anticipate that large account payable may 
indicate that the enterprise do not have adequate repaying ability. On another hand, 
investors would also anticipate that large account receivable will hinder the normal 




During the preparation oflisting, in addition to complying the listing 
regulation ofHon Kong, the company has also to decide the ownership and usage of 
some tangible and intangible assets. Tangible assets include the right of land use, 
production line and contracts, etc. Intangible assets include production technology, 
trademark and patent, etc. In North Star, they have arranged the right of land use 
from the parent company by means of paying rental. 
Pricing ofIPO 
Setting the IPO Price 
The pricing ofIPO is difficult because the expectation from the market cannot 
be accurately determined. On one hand, pricing too high may result in inadequate 
subscription while on another hand, pricing too low will harm the company by loosing 
the opportunity to raise enough fund. In practice, the underwriter sometimes offer a 
range ofprice and the final price is determined at the listing day. For example, the 
Angang New Steel had the offer price set at the range o fL61 � 1 . 9 7 per share and the 
actual price on the listing date was 1.63. 
For North Star, the market P/E ratio during their listing was about 12. North 
Star attempt to set the IPO price at a P/E ratio of 14.5 though the value ofP/E ratio 
can be set higher. North Star intentionally did so in order to stimulate the investors in 
the market to invest. As a result, the prices of international offering shoot up to a P/E 
ratio of 46. 
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Business Nature of the Enterprise 
Many SOEs have focused on one product or service only. The sources of 
income become too dependent on one particular business. In other words, being not 
diversified, the enterprise may have higher risk and become less attractive to the 
investors. 
However, if the SOE is a kind ofconglomerate where the profit income from 
any one division or subsidiary is not attractively high, unless those business is 
positioned in niche market, the economic of scales may not be achieved� In both 




The Presence of Agency Cost 
Before explaining the presence of agency cost, we have to realize the presence 
of agency relationship. An agency relationship is established when the capital issuer 
(shareholder or investor) has his capital or investment being managed by an appointed 
agent (director or manager). Theoretically speaking, an agent should try his best to 
maximize the return for the capital issuer. In return, the agent should be paid a sum of 
payment linked to his operation performance from the capital issuer. 
When the agent acts in contrary to the willing of the shareholder, such as using 
the capital inappropriately and even for the self-interest of the agent only, the agency 
problem arises. All the costs incur from the agency problem is known as the agency 
cost. 
While the purpose of the capital issuer is only one dimensional - getting 
maximum return from the investment, the desire of the agent is ofmulti dimensional = 
getting payment which is related to the return of investment and getting self-benefit 
like social achievement. The social achievement can be social status, personal 
achievement, luxury expenditure and even monetary instrument. 
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The only common benefit that both parties can obtain is the retum of 
investment. However, the salary payment of the agent is limited. Quite often, the 
agent may be more interested in the benefit described as social achievement in last 
paragraph. Actually, agency cost arises mainly because the capital issuer cannot 
monitor the agent entirely and take adequate control over the agent. Consequently the 
agent use the capital for self-interest rather than maximizing the retum! 
Traditional Agency Cost before listing as H share 
Through the Economic reform and the SOEs reform, the government tried to 
activate the enterprises so that the asset of the country can be preserved and grow with 
value. However, during the transformation, the position of ownership has not been 
made clear. Dual relationship exists between the government and the enterprise. 
1 • the government being the ownership of the asset of the enterprise 
2. the government being the administrator of the society 
Typical problems of SOEs before listing as H share company may include, not 
exclusively, the following: 
1. The ownership of the enterprise, whether owned by the country or exist as 
an entity is not clearly cut 
2. According to the company law, the enterprise has the position ofbeing a 
legal person but the enterprise does not own the asset independently. The 
entire asset is still owned by the country. However, there is no 
representative of the country asset and thus lack the monitoring of the 
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operation of the enterprise which may lead to inappropriate activity carried 
out by the agent 
3. The agent of SOEs has not been totally separated from being the 
administration officer of the government. The agent may look for not only 
the desired economic retum, but also other achievements such as social 
status, power and reputation by 
• providing more than enough employment to help the 
government in lowering the unemployment rate 
• giving out excess social benefit to please the workers and gain 
the workers' support 
Problem arises when the agent compromises the performance of the 
enterprise in return for his personal achievement. 
4. Since the salary of any administration personnel cannot be much higher 
than that of the average workers, the agent may spend the money of the 
enterprise for his own entertainment and luxury out of the need ofnormal 
operation and public relation expenditure. 
5. The government does not have adequate monitoring system to exercise the 
supervision, thus the agent may be not totally responsible for the work 
done. 
6. Since the government has more consideration such as unemployment rate, 
supporting particular industry, etc, other than the goal of maximizing the 
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profit of the enterprises, the government is hardly separated out from the 
enterprises and let the enterprise to bear the profit and loss by itself. 
7. Most departments of the government can intervene with the operation of 
the enterprise, yet without bearing the responsibility of the consequence of 
the intervention. This has made the right of autonomy difficult to be 
implemented. 
8. While the enterprise cannot afford to make loss, any loss made was bear 
by the country and let the country bear unlimited responsibility of the debt. 
This practice let the enterprise enjoy the profit made and not to bear the 
loss. 
Consolidating the above problems, the following could be observed from the SOEs� 
• Poor management with poor accounting records 
-book records not the same as the actual transaction 
• Loss of country's asset 
-being exploited by some departments and/or individuals at the expense of the 
country or even to become their asset 
• Under performance 
-many large scale investment has not been effectively used to provide the 
desired return 
• Decreasing profitability 
-while not able to create more profit, the loss keeps increasing 
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The improvement o f H share in supervisory 
In the following, we will discuss the improvement in agency cost for the H 
share enterprise. Following to each discussion, the problem of unsolved agency 
problem or newly introduced problem is further discussed. 
Representative ofthe shareholders, the board of directors 
and the supervisors committee 
In the past, the SOEs were represented by the communist party and was owned 
by the government. The Factory Manager, appointed by the government as the agent, 
conducted all functional jobs and was responsible to the government only, such as 
meeting the production quota, providing enough employment and maintaining a good 
relationship with the workers. No effective control can be used to monitor the actual 
use of the state's asset by the factory manager and his subordinate. Neither the most 
efficient agents were selected nor the full potential of the enterprise was performed. 
With the listing of the enterprise as H share company, the enterprise is now 
represented by the board of directors who in tum, representing all the shareholders. 
The board of directors and the supervisors monitors the activity of the enterprise and 
ensure the enterprise nm in the benefit of shareholder. The board of directors and the 
supervisors committee are appointed in the general meeting where the voting power 
of shareholders is exercised and the senior management is appointed by board of 
directors. 
With the operation of the enterprise mainly being run by the senior 
management, the board of directors monitors how well the senior management has 
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performed. Furthermore, the supervisors committee will view the appropriateness of 
the control by the board of directors. 
Problem 
In our study, 33^ out of the 39 H share companies have an average government 
holding of 58%^ shares of the enterprise. Actually, we leam from North Star that it is 
the government's policy to retain more than 50% share of the enterprise. With the 
country remain to be the major share holder by holding non transferable state share, 
the appointment of directors and supervisors are virtually the same as if it was the 
case of SOEs without going into public. 
In North Star, all the directors are appointed the Beijing City government who 
represents the State. Only the middle management (处长级 ) a r e appointed from the 
market. For background information, the city government has started to recruit 
personnel from the market into the government for the highest possible position of 
deputy director (副局级). 
The role ofbeing an agent and a representative of the shareholder is 
sometimes overlapped. Typical cases are that the Chairman of the board of directors 
is also the general manager of the enterprise. The monitoring of the performance of 
the agent would rely on other media like the market. 
The not well developed manager market, also restrict the pool of candidates 
that the board of directors can choose from. 
4 33 companies were selected due to the limitation in getting the data for all the 39 companies 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Responsibility ofthe board of directors to monitor the enterprise 
As briefly described in the last paragraph, the board of directors is voted by 
the shareholders and representing all the shareholders, therefore, every decision and 
activity should correspond to the benefit of the shareholders. 
Although in practice, the original management teams from the enterprise 
before getting listed is selected upon listing, the main rationale is to ensure the newly 
listed company will run in order. From the case of Shanghai Petrochemical described 
in the case, we can see that subsequent reappointment of directors is not an odd event 
for H share enterprise. The benefit of this is the appointment of capable agent who 
would most likely to increase the performance of the enterprise so that the 
shareholders can be benefited. 
Incentive system 
An improvement for H share company over SOEs, the salary of the workers 
are linked to the performance of the enterprise. As leamt from the interviews, for 
example, Kunming Machine Tool has all their workers paid according to the 
performance ofthe company and the remuneration of director set at a fixed multiple 
ofworkers' salary decided in the general meeting. 
Another example, Zhejiang Expressway has fixed the determination of 
remuneration and bonus in the service contract for the senior management where the 
actual amount depends on the performance of the. company. The bonus of other 






Although the salary and bonus is linked to the companies' performance, the 
magnitude ofincrement is limited. For the case ofNorth Star, a ceiling is set on both 
the salary and bonus of the directors. The salary of director cannot be three times 
higher than the wages of average worker and the maximum bonus will not exceed half 
of the annual salary. 
problem 
Unlike the 'red chip’ companies, H share company cannot offer salary to the 
director and senior management at a much higher rate than the average worker even 
though the directors or the senior executives are capable in increasing the company's 
profit. The limit on setting the salary level has been accounted by historical reason 
that everyone, the management and the worker are working for the State. The weight 
ofcontribution to the enterprise had not been taken into account. 
The ’’A’，- shares 
In some cases, the H share companies are also listed as A share companies in 
one of the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock exchange. Some companies offer the 
company shares to the senior management as part of the incentive system so that the 
maximum retum of the company can be achieved. 
Actually, we found that most directors own some company shares when the 
companies issue both A and H shares. For example, all the directors and workers of 
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Shanghai Petrochemical own the A shares of the company and this is part of the 
incentive system. 
However, in another example, the Northeast Electrical Transmission and 
Transformation Machinery Manufacturing said that the directors' interest ofowning A 
shares is purely personal and has nothing to do with the incentive system. 
problem 
Companies which only issue H share without yet issuing the A share may not 
be able to fully enforce the commitment of the directors and the workers in improving 
the company's performance. 
The non-monetarv benefit 
Since the salary ofthe management cannot be much higher than the average 
worker due to the philosophy ofcommunism that the country is owned by everyone 
and the leader is obliged to serve the people. In this case, there could be an 
encouragement for the agent to exploit the using of asset or capital of the company for 
self-interest purpose such as travelling, luxury housing, cars, entertainment, gift and 
other luxury expenditure. 
In the case ofNorth Star, they have a strict rule that any workers, including 
director and senior management cannot receive a gift worth more than an equivalent 
o fRMB 200 unless the receiving of the gift has been reported and approved by the 
board ofdirectors. Furthermore, the company supplies the housing at the work place 
to avoid inappropriate housing subsidizing expenses and travelling expenses. 
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Monitoring the management 
It cannot be denied that the stock market in China is still in development stage� 
Somehow, the parent company who hold the listed SOEs as a major shareholder 
representing the State has difficulty to have a more objective evaluation on the 
performance ofthe listed SOE. The main reason is due to the inefficient stock market 
and information asymmetry between the parent company and the listed SOE. 
The above situation is improved to a certain extent by getting listed in a more 
efficient market overseas like Hong Kong. Though the source ofinfomation, the H-
shares companies, is still commented as lacking transparency. The overall 
information disclosure system required by the market, the equity analyst and the 
media are more demanding. Actually, in addition to the disclosure required by the 
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), equity analysts ofinvestment 
banks and some financial institutions frequently visit those H share companies to 
realize their actual operation and situation. Therefore, the listing o f H share helps to 
produce a more objective standard for the parent company to evaluate the 
performance of the listed company. 
In the case ofNorth Star, they have experienced to serve visiting guests from 
financial institutions at an average of one delegation per two days after the listing in 
Hong Kong. Some financial institutions have branch office, representative office or 
contact point in PRC. However, the persons in PRC serve as the contacting agent, 
and the visiting guests for interview come directly from abroad. 
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problem 
SOEs are competing in an inefficient market where the performance may not 
necessary be related to the capability and quality of work done by the agent. Some 
SOEs has special benefit or burden because ofhistorical matters. For example, heavy 
burden for supporting retired worker, too capital intensively invested with the lack of 
comparative advantage, too high debt ratio, etc. Hence, the cost ofmonitoring the 
agent becomes high. 
Responsiveness of the Hshare company 
We found that it is not as easy as imagined in getting the contact point for the 
H share company. Actually, we have tried to make contact with all the 39 H share 
companies and ask for questions like the incentive programs and the difficulty they 
had encountered during the listing. However, we can only get 29 contacts 
successfully out ofthe 39 companies from a number of ways. Furthermore, only 24 
were successfully contacted. Reason of some failure was that the line is either always 
busy or no answer. Finally, we received only seven replies to us. 
The Independent non-executive directors 
One ofthe listing requirement in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange is the 
appointment oftwo non-executive directors. The benefit of such appointment is to 
ensure the interest of shareholder should not be harmed by the connected transaction, 
• Candidate for the appointment of independent non-executive directors should 
have no business transaction with the listed company with the exception of 
some professionals like the solicitor and the accountant. 
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• In our study, the independent non-executive directors may not be the most 
favorable combination as many of them are from the professional 
organization. 
The supervisory committee 
We found that most companies appoint the workers supervisors who are 
working in their company, in the parent company as well as the subsidiary company. 
Social burden 
Investors outside China are usually stunned by the huge social benefit 
provided by the enterprise to the workers. The tradition of'the enterprise run the 
socie ty '(企业办社会)has been long rooted in the establishment of the enterprise in 
China and cannot be removedjust by a couple of years ofeconomic reform. 
• During the restructuring, some SOEs has spin off the part providing social benefits 
while some do not do so at all. 
Other benefit 
Not surprising, the listing o f H share company is strongly supported by the 
Chinese Government and each particular H share company obtain some preferential 
treatments from the government such as the preferential tax rate. Most recently listed 
H shares company including North Star has a tax rebate o f l 5 % from the 33% 
corporate tax rate. 
The evidence of getting the full support for H share company from the 
government can be seen from the total preparation time for getting listed. Beijing 
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Yanhua Petrochemical took less than half year and North Star took only four months, 
where the four months period was recorded as the shortest preparation time at the time 
being. While Zhejiang Expressway took a little bit long time of eleven months, they 
expressed that no big problem was encountered. The most complicated parts had 
been the complying of legal matters and the preparation of accounting report 
according to Hong Kong standard of practice. 
Connected transaction 
Through the selection of the appropriate holding company as the share holder, 
the internal competition among the industry should have been avoided. 
Although some of the listed H share company has been separated out from 
providing various social benefit such as housing, education to the workers and have 
this responsibility bear by the holding company or parent company. The holding 
company has the right to supply the material to the listed company for production. 
From the point ofview ofthe supervisor, this is connected transaction. For example, 
the main raw material for Shanghai Petrochemical is cmde oil where the supply of 
crude oil has a certain dependence on the parent company. 
Holding company and the board of directors has certain influential power over 
the listed company. Potentially, the listed company sometimes has to accept 
unfavorable offer or terms in favor of the holding company that harm the public 
shareholder. The best remedy could be the need of adequate disclosure to avoid 
unhealthy operation by reflecting the appropriateness of transaction on the share price. 
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Further control on the agent 
Direct linkage between the salary payment to the agent and the performance of 
the enterprise is necessary to let the agent to perform the best. However, once the 
agent is authorized with power, we need other mean to control and avoid the agent 
from performing the agency problems discussed. 
Basically, the following are common means adopted in monitoring and 
controlling the agent from exercising the power inappropriately. 
1. The Financial Market 
Public shareholders are usually not involved in the operation ofthe company. 
I f the performance of the company is not desirable, public shareholders would 
probably sell out their shares and the share price of the company will drop. 
The rise and fall of the share price of the company should reflect considerably 
the performance of the company, and hence the quality of operation of the agent� 
Our Evaluation 
Although the financial market - the stock market, can serve to indicate the 
performance ofthe company on the share price, this mechanism may not work well 
on the H share companies. Investors in Hong Kong treat the H share companies as 
speculative tools instead of a mean for long term investment. The prices of all the H 
share companies are significantly influenced by the news from the Chinese 
government. Hence, the share price of any H share company may reflect mainly the 
confidence ofthe public share holders on the Chinese government instead of the 
satisfaction on the performance of the company. 
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For examples, the price o f H share companies were affected recently by the 
following two news. 
• The selling ofhouses to the employees at a low price 
• The difficulty of retrieving the cash already deposited in the bank in PRC 
2. Manager Market 
In places where the manager market is mature and active, every agent of the 
company will experience the pressure that if they are not performing well, then the 
board ofdirectors may look for more capable manager from the market and replace 
the incapable agent in the company. 
Our Evaluation • 
Since the professional manager market is not mature in PRC yet, the manager 
market method may not be fully applicable. Apart from the maturity of the manager 
market, the attitude of the government as the major share holder of the H share 
companies is also very important. The directors appointed by the government and the 
pool of candidates for subsequent changes in personnel who replace the retired 
directors and senior management are also from the original enterprise or the parent 
and subsidiaries of the enterprise. Only the middle management is possibly recruited 
from the market. In this case, effective replacement of senior management is limited 
by the manager market segment - the enterprise, and the attitude of the government “ 
willingness to reappoint. 
3. Product competition 
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When product is traded on the market where the competition is more intense 
for the commodity type product, the pressure on the agent comes from their ability to 
operate efficiency in order to reduce the cost. 
I f the company cannot sustain a desirable growth due to incompetence ofcost 
reduction, the agent's ability in operating the company efficiently is in question. 
Our Evaluation 
At the moment, the industries sectors of the H share companies are mainly the 
heavy industries and the infrastructure business. Some heavy industry which produce 
commodity like products such as steel plate and petrochemical products may have to 
improve the performance in order to compete for survivals. 
However, some of the other H share companies are not competing in an open 
arena, but running under certain protection. For examples, the China Eastem Airlines, 
the China Southern Airlines, several highways companies and the railway companies 
are enjoying certain protection from other rivals because ofthe route ofservices 
provided. Those companies running under partially protected environment may not 
be effectively affected by the product competition. 
4. Merger and Acquisition 
If the company under-perform because of poor management, other enterprise 
may acquire the under-performing enterprise, restructure the board ofdirectors and 
reappoint capable managers. 
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Our Evaluation 
This mechanism can be effective on the condition that the State could give up 
the position ofbeing the major share holder and let the state share be traded in the 
public market. 
5. Restructure the share ownership 
For the sake ofletting the company achieve the highest performance, the share 
ownership should consist of a number of major shareholders with everyone of each 
has significant interest or business in relation with the company and let the major 
shareholders stay in the board of directors. Since the performance of the company, 
such as effective cost reduction and efficient operation directly affect the benefit of 
the shareholders, the board of directors will tnily represent the interest o f the 
shareholders and monitor the running of the company. 
Our Evaluation 
Similar to the case of merger and acquisition，the restructuring of share 
ownership is achievable on the condition that the government could give up the 
position ofbeingthe share holder and let the state share be traded on the market like 





Before the exercising of contract responsibility system (CRS), government 
inject money as per the need of the SOEs. In other words, the government will 
provide the fund so that the enterprise can function normally. 
After the CRS was implemented, the government did not inject money into the 
enterprise, as before, the enterprise had to rely on debt financing to raise fund. Some 
possible forms of debt financing are bank loan, corporate bond and debenture, etc. 
However, the bank loan had been mostly used as the source of debt financing. 
Bank Loan 
The cost ofbank loan depends on the interest rate. From the graph below, we 
can see that the lending rate has been kept at a level in the range between of 
8.6%-11.3%. • 
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Lending Rate of RMB, 1989 ~ 1996 
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Figure 15. Lending Rate o fRMB (1989-1996) 
One point needed to be noted that the lending rates for different industries are 
different. Lending rates for different application are tabulated below for reference� 
Table 18 
Lending Rates for Different Industries and Applications 
" " " r ^ ~ ~ ~ ~ T m ~ ~ ~ ~ r ^ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ r ^ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ r ^ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ i ^ ~ " 
Apr Aug A ^ May M May 
General 
3 Months 7.92% 7.92% 
6 Months 9.00% 8.64% 8.10% 8.82% 9.00% 9.72% 
1 Year 10.08% 9.36% 8.64% 9.36% 10.98% 10.98%  
kidustrial & Commercial 
Floating Floating Floating Floating Floating 
20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 
based on based on based on based on based on 
10.08% 9.36% 8.64% 9.36% 10.98% 
Technical Updates 
10.08% 9.36% 8.46% 9.18% 10.98% 
Capital Construction 
l Y e a r a n d less 10.08% 9.36% 8.46% 9.18% 10.98% 11.52% 
l�3Years 10.80% 10.08% 9.00% 10.80% 12.24% 13.14% 
3 � 5 Y e a r s 11.52% 10.80% 9.54% 12.05% 13.86% 14.94% 
5 - l O Y e a r s 11.88% 11.16% 9.72% 12.24% 14.04% 15.12% 
over 10 Years 11.88% 11.16% see note  
note: same lending rate as of 5 ~ 10 Years after21 April 1991 
source: China Statistical Publishing House, Interest Rates ofMajor Savings Loan (1990-1996) , Nov. 1997，p.l4 
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However, the problem for the SOEs who need capital for investment and 
development were more affected by the economic policy rather than the interest rate. 
After the macroeconomic control introduced by former vice prime minister Zhurongji, 
the bank were restricted to approve loan easily even though the money reserve was 
ample. The policy at that time was strongly against the approval ofbank loan to some 
land developers because a number of developers were building luxury apartments and 
houses in an attempt to get high profit margin. Without the debt financing, the SOEs 
had to look for other mean for raising capital. 
In the case ofNorth Star, they said that the bank loan used to be their major 
source of financing. Although North Star is a land developer, they can get the bank 
loan easily as different from the case of other land developers for a number of reason� 
According to the 15th Party Congress, the State sees the residential housing as 
one of the major economic development. Only the luxury apartment developers are 
affected by the macroeconomic control. Since North Star focus at developing 
ordinary residential housing, therefore they are not negatively affected by the policy� 
Furthermore, North Star is a relatively young company whose financial status 
is not complicated. Together with the Beijing City government as the background of 
the company and the strong support from Beijing City government, North Star can get 
the bank loan easily. 
For information, the lending rate that North Star can get during their period of 
listing in May 1997 was about 10.08% and the lending rate at Feb 1998 was about 7 � 
8%. 
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In considering the transaction cost of debt financing, the interest cost may not 
be the only cost. Even if a company is willing to pay interest, the company may not 
be able to get the loan. Other costs in securing the loan are yet unknown. 
Listing as H share 
The listing provides a mean of capital financing. We will focus on the cost 
benefit for having listed as H share in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, especially 
compare with bank loan. 
Cost of listing 
The largest cost oflisting could be the payment of underwriting fee. Among 
the 39 H share companies, we have selected eight companies to study the average cost 
ofunderwriting fee. The eight companies are selected based on the following criteria, 
• The H share is traded in Hong Kong only (we do not include the H share which are 
issued and traded in other exchange through the ADS and GDS) 
• The actual issuance of H shares had not been exercised with the option，if any 
From our result, the average percentage cost of underwriting over the capital 
raised is 5.37%^ . And the range ofwhich is between 4.09% and 7.61%. 
Comparing to the cost ofborrowing money from the bank at the same period, 
the cost oflisting is certainly more attractive, not mentioning other benefit that the 
listed company can get through listing. 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































Trend of IPO cost against time 
Date ofListing Listing Cost per 
Raised Capital 
• 12/7/93 7.61% 
5/17/94 — 5.64% 
6/6/94 一 5.20% “ 
7/8/94 — 4.69% 一 
— 1 2 / 1 3 / 9 4 6.25% 
12/16/94 — 4.93% 
11/13/96 4.58% 
5/15/97 4.09% 
source: prospectus and annual report of the companies used 
From table 22, we can obverse that the listing cost has a decreasing trend over 
time. 
Relation between Listing Cost per Raised Capital 
and Raised Capital Size 
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Figure 16. Relation between Listing Cost per Raised Capital and Raised Capital Size 
Furthermore, from the above graph, we can observe that the listing cost per 
raised capital is roughly inversely proportional to the raised capital size. 
89 
Other Cost for Listing 
Last but not the least, in addition to the payment to the underwriter, there are 
also several other costs that the listing companies had to pay. 
• First time listing fee 
• Listing maintenance fee 
• Auditing fee, printing charge and distribution of annual report 
• Public Relation 
• Other fee 
First time listing fee and Listing maintenance fee 
The price list for the first time listing and the maintenance fee are described in 
the following tables. 
Table 21 
First-Time Listing Fee 
Value of capital share First time listing fee 
secutrity to be listed, 
HKD (mil.) 1 ^  







1,500 — 400,000 
2,00Q — 450,000 




more than 5,000 650,000 
source: Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
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Table 22 
Maintenance Fee of Listing 
Value of capital share Maintenance of listing 
secutrity listed, fee 
HKD (mil.) m D  









2,500 一 576,000 一 
3,000 660,000 
. 4,QQ0 816,000 
5,000 972,000 
more than 5,000 1,080,000 — 
source: H o n g K o n g Stock Exchange 
Auditing fee, printing charge and distribution of annual report 
Once the company is listed, the company has to maintain the transparency and 
issue the annual report to the shareholder. 
Auditing fee is chargeable because the Hong Kong Stock Exchange required 
that the financial statements of the listed company should be audited by independent 
accounting firm. The preparation of annual report would involve the auditing cost, 
printing cost and the distribution cost, etc. 
Public Relation 
When the company listed, they would receive a lot of inquiries from the public 
shareholder and also the analysts of investment banks and financial institutions. 
While maintaining the image and transparency of the company, public relation 
expenses cannot be avoided. Although the specific amount may not be determined 
91 
directly, the workload of the staff in dealing such inquiries should not be 
underestimated. 
Other charges 
There are also charges on subsequent issues of shares, warrants, etc, which are 
not described here. Anyway, charging information is easily available from the Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange. 
The nature ofhaving debt financing and equity financing is quite different� 
Interest payment could be the only matter that concem with the maintenance ofbank 
loan. Furthermore, the company can have from tax shield benefit. For equity 
financing, the listed company have to, in addition to paying dividend to the 
shareholder, expense a fortune to keep the transparency of the company. 
The listing o f H shares, has not only provide a less expensive mean of raising 
capital when comparing with lending rate of the same period, but also provide 
alternative way to choose for raising capital, considering the cost of raising capital 




With the listing as H shares become successful, the uncertainty of the H share 
company is reduced to some extent. However, there are some uncertainties that 
remain unsolved and also new uncertainty introduced after the listing. 
Uncertainty reduced 
Source ofFinancing - Equity Financing 
Historically, SOEs strongly rely on the debt financing - bank loan to support 
their normal activities. With the economic reform and the macroeconomic control， 
getting bank loan becomes extremely difficult not concerning the cost. The listing as 
H share provides a good source of equity fmancing for the H share company to raise 
fond for desired investment and usage. 
More Efficient and Effective Management 
With the disclosure requirement and involvement of the general public 
especially the investment bank analysts as the monitoring agents, the H share 
company become more transparent and the performance and operations of the 
company is reflected on the share price. The management receives more pressure in 
acting for the shareholders and would try their best to increase the performance of the 
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company by means of more efficient and effective management. While without the 
public monitoring, the management of the enterprise may misuse and even 
cannibalizing the assets of the enterprise. 
Furthermore, with the remuneration of the directors linked to the performance 
of the company. Theeffort in improving the performance of the company is 
rewarded. 
The uncertainty of whether the management will perform their best and 
whether the capital of investors is used appropriately is improved by the public 
monitoring. 
Preservation and Growth of State Assets 
One of the main purposes of the economic reform and the shareholding system 
is to have the asset of the enterprise (state) preserved and grow. With the public 
monitoring which push the management to increase the performance of the enterprise, 
the desired purpose could be achieved. Otherwise, the incentive system alone may 
not be attractive enough to initiate the management to achieve the said purpose. 
Reputation 
Many SOEs are claimed to have ill operation and questionable financial status� 
With the listing o f H share, the particular enterprise gains certain reputation. First of 
all, the company has gone through all the requirements needed to be listed in Hong 
Kong which are set for protecting the investors. Furthermore, the disclosed 
information enable interested prospective partner to look into before entering any 
agreement. In other words, the H share company, if perceived to be healthy by the 
market, should be less likely to go into trouble. 
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Furthermore, with the reputation and experience gained in getting listed, the H 
share company can have better opportunity to be listed in other exchange. 
Liquidity of Stock 
Hong Kong is one of the major financial center in the world. At the present 
moment when the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange is still 
under development, the trading volume and pool of investors are still larger in Hong 
Kong. Getting list as H share certainly increases the liquidity of stock. 
Interest of Investors 
Since Hong Kong is geographically and culturally connected and linked to the 
China, investors in Hong Kong have more interests in investing in the China market 
and also have more in depth understanding and knowledge about China backed by the 
large number of analysts specializing in China affairs and the setting ofHang Seng 
Chinese Enterprise Index. 
Higher Autonomy 
With the share of the H share company freely traded on the market, interested 
investors may enter into the board of directors by acquiring adequate number of 
shares from the market. Since decisions and appointment of managers are made in 
the board of directors, the involvement of the investors in the board of directors 
enables the company to exercise higher autonomy. 
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Uncertainty Not Reduced 
Reliance on Parent Company 
Certain H share companies rely much on the parent company who is also the 
holding company. For example, the major raw material of Shanghai Petrochemical is 
crude oil and Shanghai Petrochemical rely on the parent company as the source of raw 
material. Such fiduciary position may force the H share company to accept 
unfavorable terms of supply. 
Foreign Currency 
Once the H share company receive the Hong Kong dollar through the issuing 
o f H shares, by regulation, the company has to convert the Hong Kong dollar back to 
RMB immediately. Although the government has permitted the converting o fRMB 
back to foreign exchange at a rate set by the SAEC daily and through the Swap 
Centers established by the PRC State Administration ofExchange Control (SAEC 
中国国家外汇管理局 ) , t h e H share company cannot hedge the currency 
fluctuation and depreciation by holding Hong Kong dollar and/or other currency. 
Separation of Government from the Enterprise 
The government remains to the major shareholder o f H share company by 
holding more than 50% of non transferable state share. Since the government may 
have considerations other than maximizing the profit of the H share company, the H 
share company cannot have the absolute autonomy in operation. The dual role of the 




The managers being appointment are mostly from the original enterprise. One 
of the main reasons of such practice could be that the manager market is not mature. 
Although the appointment of the original team can ensure the enterprise will run 
smoothly after the listing, immature manager market hinder the enterprise from 
choosing the most appropriate candidate. 
Political and Economic Risk 
Hong Kong is very sensitive to the political issues ofPRC. During the past 
few years, the government announced some policies from time to time. Since the 
economic environment is formulated by the government, both the political and 
economic risk remain unsolved. 
New Uncertainty Introduced 
Greater Exposure to Speculations ofthe Market 
Obviously, the buy and sell activity is very active after the H share company is 
listed in Hong Kong. Despite the advantage that the enterprise can raise additional 
fund in the future, the fluctuation in the price of the company share due to any 
political, economic and corporate reason will encourage speculative activity. 
As indicated by the movement of Hang Seng Chinese Enterprise Index, the 
relative high fluctuation encourages people in the market to buy and sell H shares 
speculatively. Because of the high instability of the H share price traded in the 
market, the H share company may not be able to raise fund at any time especially 
when the price goes unfavorably low. Furthermore, investors are also less likely to 
take H shares as long term investment. 
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The Social Burden's Return 
Although some H share companies have transferred the liability of providing 
social benefit to the parent company, we found a case that some time after the listing, 
the parent company release some of the liability and let the H share company be 
responsible for the social welfare like housing. Detail discussion on the said problem 
is described and discussed in our case for Shanghai Petrochemical. 
Nevertheless, we would like to point out that with the state remain to be the 
major shareholder, professionals appointed as non-executive directors and company 
staff appointed as supervisors, the social burden may in a way or another be 
transferred back to the H share company from the parent company even if the liability 
of providing social benefit is spin off at the beginning. 
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CHAPTER X 
CASE : SHANGHAI PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY LIMITED 
Introduction 
The Shanghai Petrochemical Company Limited ("the Company") is one of the 
largest petrochemical enterprises in PRC based on 1996 sales. It is also one of the 
largest PRC producers of ethylene. The Company also produces a broad range of 
synthetic fibers, resins and plastics, intermediate petrochemical products and 
petroleum products. 
The precedent of the company, the Shanghai Petrochemical Complex (“SPC，，） 
founded in the early 1970s is the largest petrochemical enterprise and the ninth largest 
industrial enterprise in the PRC based on 1992 sales (before listing). The SPC has 
over 60,000 employees and fixed assets worth several billion yuan. 
Under the SOEs reform, the SPC was designated to be one of the nine pilot 
SOEs to be listed the Hong Kong stock market. Subsequent restructuring brought 
about the birth of the Shanghai Petrochemical Company Limited (“ the Company"). 
In 1993, the Company became the first company organized under the laws of 
the PRC to make a global equity offering. Its shares are listed in Shanghai Securities 
Exchange, the Stock Exchange ofHong Kong Stock Exchange and the New York 
Stock Exchange. The Company has made itself one ofhighest turnover H-shares m 
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Hong Kong Stock Exchange and the company with the largest market capitalization in 
the PRC stock market in 1995. Its also tops in tumover and net profit ( in 1995). 
The capital raising activities not only fuels the development of the company, 
but also bring about fundamental changes in the SOEs in the ownership, corporate 
strategies, management, employees, etc. 
Background 
The Shanghai Petrochemical Complex has been managed under the planned 
economy for over two decades. 
The Ownership 
It is directly supervision of the China Petrochemical Corporation ( “Sinopec”)� 
Sinopec was established in 1983 with the responsibility for the administration and 
development of the petrochemical industry. As a ministry-level enterprise under the 
direct supervision and control of the State Council, Sinopec is also responsible for 
formulating PRC national policies for the petrochemical industry and supervising the 
construction and the operation of petrochemical plants. 
Sinopec controls 38 enterprises producing six major groups of petrochemical 
products: petroleum products, intermediate petrochemicals, resins and plastics, 
synthetic fibers, synthetic rubber and fertilizers. 
State Control and Subsidies 
Central government agencies, such as the State Planning Commission, and 
their local or provincial level counterparts do not own or direct control production 
facilities. However, they, through and together with Sinopec, exercise significant 
control over the petrochemical industry in areas such as pricing, production quotas, 
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quality standards, allocation of raw materials and finished products, allocation of 
foreign exchange and allocation of the RMB loans for capital construction projects. 
The central government's development objectives and policies relationg to the 
petrochemical are stated as part of various State plans, including the eighth five-year 
plan for 1991-1995 and the ten-year strategic plan for 1991-2000. These plans have 
identified certain products of petrochemical industry, such as ethylene, as priority 
items for development. 
Raw Materials Supplies 
Cmde oil is the only significant raw material purchased by the Company from 
outside sources. In 1992, crude oil purchases accounted for approximately 46.0% of 
the total cost of sales. Therefore, the supply and price of cmde oil are key factors in 
determining the Company's profitability. 
Currently, all petrochemical producers controlled by Sinopec obtain a 
substantial portion of their crude oil requirements pursuant to state allocations at State 
Price substantially below international market prices. 
In 1992，approximately 97.5% of the Company's total crude oil consumption 
was allocated by the PRC government with remainder purchased at the international 
market prices from domestic and international sources. 
Sinopec has undertaken that it will allocate crude oil to the Company in 
quantities and prices no less favorable than the quantities received and prices paid by 
other Sinopec-controlled enterprises. 
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Sales and Marketing 
Prior to September 1992, allocations and prices of petrochemical products 
were set by the PRC government. All sales contracts in respect of petrochemical 
products sold under the State Plan. Either the entire or a portion of the estimated 
production of a given product would be allocated to designate purchasers. 
Price of each product sold under the State Plan were uniformly set by the PrC 
government fro the entire petrochemical industry with reference to the average cost of 
PRC producers, "Fixed Prices". Most of the products produced outside of the State 
Plan or in excess of the Sate Plan allocation requirements were also required to be 
sold at Fixed Prices. 
Import and Foreign Exchange Restriction 
Imports of many petrochemical products are subject to tariffs, import quotas 
and other restrictions, and the PRC government also restricts the availability of 
foreign exchange with which the imports must be purchased. The combination of 
price differentials, tariffs and quotas, as well as the restrictions in foreign exchange 
reduces the effect of foreign competition in the absence of any quality difference� 
Management 
Basically, the SPC was run under the typical SOEs management system that 
the “factory manager"(廠長余】).Despite that the SPC had adopted the Contract 
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Responsibility System, the power of the appointment of factory manager were held by 
the government. The lifetime appointment of factory manger was not uncommon. 
The “Little Society，， 
The SPC was described as “ a huge elephant". Under the social economic 
system, like many other SOEs, the SOE was responsible for the "total" care of their 
employees. It took care of a total of 60,000 employees with life-time employment and 
retirement benefits. The whole factory was nothing less than a "little society". 
Apart from the production facilities, the SPC supported a full range of social 
facilities; 
Academic facilities : Petrochemical Secondary School, Petrochemical 
Technical School, Design Institute, Association of Science and Technology, etc.; 
Medical facilities : Jinshan Hospital, Sanatorium, etc.; 
Media : Jinshan Newspaper Press, Cable Television Station; 
A Stadium 
The employee was provided housing, catering and medical services, as well 
as，retirement benefits supported by the SPC. 
Financing History 
Shanghai Petrochemical Complex underwent three major stages of 
construction. The ways of fmancing shows the clear migration from the planned 
economic towards market-oriented system. 
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• The first stage (1972-1976) - Government Allocation 
The construction included reclamation of land and the installation of 18 
production units. 
They called upon the supervisory department who allocated the total capital 
required, RMB2.1b to the company. 
• The second stage (1980-1986) - Government Loan and Enterprise 
Responsibility to Repay 
The projects increased SPC's processing capacity for crude oil and doubled its 
capacity for the production of synthetic fibres. 
The projects were financed by government loan ofRMB2.34b and be repaid by 
the enterprise, which forced the SOEs towards the more self-sufficient market-
oriented direction and lay down the foundation of future structural reform. 
• The third stage ( 1987-1992) - Self-financing: Loans, bonds, etc. 
The construction primarily comprised the installation of a 300,000 ethylene unit, 
and additional crude oil refining unit and other units for petrochemical products. 
With the change brought by the SOEs reform, SPC became one of the first SOEs 
to sign the contract with the government under the Contract Responsibility System 
and became financially independent. The retained profit was only 3.92%, which 
was far from enough for the development. To add more weight to the financial 
needs, the SPC was a typical SOE as "little society", the running cost 
requirements were huge. 
At that moment, the PRC was under the tightening of the monetary policy by the 
central government. The SPC was under great pressure for indebtedness and lack 
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of working capital, to a point that there was only RMB7,000 left in the SOEs， 
bank account. 
To resolve the financial crisis, the SPC sought the employees for financing�It 
issued corporate bonds at RMB200 to its 60,000 employees to raise over 
RMB11 OK to help solve the capital crisis. 
Indebtedness 
In 1992, the SPC completed the construction of the grand project of the 
300,000 tons ethylene unit. However, it also left the SOE with huge debt: Foreign 
debt OJSD 470M), corporate bond (RMB 1.35b), other RMB debts (RMB 3b), with 
the average annual interest rate at as high as 12%! 
Because of the entangled ownership structure, the construction ( in the third 
stage ) was took under the government, asset became stated-owned, the production 
and prices was controlled by the government, BUT the indebtedness was to be bear by 
the enterprise. 
According to the repayment capacity, even if the exchange rate unchanged, 
they could only repay the debt till 2008. 
If the debt was to be repaid through government tax rebate and the additional 
earning, the repayment capacity of the SPC was only RMB72,670. Even to meet the 
annual coupon payment for the corporate bond ofRMB 1.12b, there was still 
RMB39,330 short. 
They would still have to repay the foreign debts, domestic debts and the 
current liability, etc. The repayment capacity shortfall was as high as RMBlb. The 
SOE was in critical financial conditions. 
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The Economic Reform 
In September 1992, the Company was designated by the central government to 
try out the joint stock system and sell its stocks overseas. The government was 
expected to reduce its control over the management of the SOE. 
As part of its economic liberalization program, the PRC government 
announced a decision gradually to relax its control over the allocation and pricing of 
most petrochemical products. In addition to lowering many allocation quotas, some 
products have been removed from the State Plan altogether. The prices of supplies 
and products were expected to increase and so would the domestic competition. 
The Fundamental Changes 
Restructuring 
Ownership 
To prepare for the global offering, a new wholly owned subsidiary, Sinopec 
Shanghai Jinshan Industrial Company (中國石化上海金山實業公司）w a s 
established under the Sinopec. at the same times as the Company. All the assets and 
liabilities of SPC were transferred to two entities, the Company and Jinshan, as 
approved by the Sate Restructuring Commission (中國國家經濟體制改革 
委員會).The Company was established as ajoint-stock limited and JI as a SOE� 
SPC ceased to exist as a legal entity upon the establishment of the two companies. 
As a part of the restructuring, the Company has assumed those assets and 
liabilities of SPC which relate to SPC's petrochemical business, as well as certain 
utility plants, railroad and other transportation facilities, research institute, interests in 
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domestic and foreignjoint ventures and certain other assets and liabilities. In retum, 
the Company issued 4000M shares to the Sinopec, which exercised the rights of 
ownership of SPC on behalf of the PRC government prior to the Restructuring. 
Sinopec also exercises the rights of ownership of Jinshan on behalf of the PRC 
government. 
Jinshan assumed all the assets and liabilities of SPC which were not assumed 
by the Company. Those assets and liabilities belong to services companies and 
divisions which provide social services, governmental flmctions and other services to 
the Company. 
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PublicAShares LegalPerson CMna PublicHShares 
A Shares Petrochemical 
10.00 2.08 55.56 32.36% 
Shanghai Petrochemical 
Chemical Investment Distribution Plastic Prod. Chemical Acrylic 
Products Management of petroleum Production & Product Product 
Trading & petroche- Processing Production Production 
micaI product 
100% 55% 51% 65% 100% 
Associated Golden Shanghai Shanghai Shanghai 
Development Resources Jinshan Jinhuan Petro- Jinyang 
Corporation Petrochemical United Ind. napthalene Acrylic Fibre 
ofSPC Co., Ltd. Co., Ltd. Dev. Ltd. Plant 
100% 100% 70% 52.5% 53.4% 70% 
Shenzhen SPC Shanghai Shanghai Zhejiang China Jinshan 
Jinshan Marketing Jinhua Jindong Jinzhe Aoosciated 
Polyester Development Industrial Petrochemical Petrochemical Trading 
Co., Ltd. Corporaton Co., Ltd. Industrial Associated Corporation 
Co., Ltd. Company 
Figure 17. Organization Structure of Shanghai Petrochemical 
Source: the Company Prospectus 
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Solutions to Traditional Burdens 
Management 
The management of the company transformed from the traditional "factory 
manager" system to the management system centered at the board ofdirectors. 
The first board of directors basically consisted of the original team of management 
from the SPC. Theoretically, the management is empowered by the shareholders' 
meeting and manages the company to maximize the shareholder's interest. The power 
of appointment and release of the management is held by the shareholders. 
The structure relax the management of the executive-ordering style of 
management by the central government, which provides more freedom for the 
managers to direct the company in accordance with the market drives so as to best 
benefit the shareholders. 
Practically, the problem of separation of the government from the SOE is only 
partly resolved not by the mechanism but at the will of releasing power by the central 
government. There are still much rooms for government intervention to take place as 
to be discussed in the following sessions. 
The introduction of the Supervisory Committee was intended to incorporate 
corporate control through the employees to the board of directors. The Supervisory 
Committee was appointed by the shareholders' meeting to supervise senior 
management of the Company, including the Board ofDirectors, managers and senior 
officers on behalf of the shareholders' meeting. 
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Shareholders' Meeting 
Board ofDirectors ^perv i^ry 
Committee 
President President's Office 
I I I I I I I _ _ 
Marketing R & D International Production Planning Administration Finance 
Division Division Division Diviison Division & Personnd Division 
Division 
Refining Petrochemicals Polyester Plastics Acrylics Power 
Division Division Division Division Division Division 
Figure 18. Management Hierarchy ofShanghai Petrochemical 
Source: The Company Prospectus 
Redundant Personnel 
As expressed by the ex-Chairman of the Board and General Manager, Mr. 
Wang Minji, the most difficult part of restructuring was not on the valuation, nor 
accounting system, etc., but was about the change of the mind-set ofthe people. 
Firstly, after the restructuring, the employees have to change to contract base 
employment J&om the traditional life-time permanent employment. There was 
tremendous resistance. Until the time ofIPO, the company had about 40,000 
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employees, only 25% was contract employees and the rest would be changed in the 
subsequent two years to contract workers. 
Secondly, the SPC divided into two entities, the Company and Jinshan, which 
also implied that 40,000 out of the 60,000 employees would go to the Company and 
the rest 20,000 would stay in Jinshan. Since the two companies were fundamentally 
different in their business nature, one is for profit generating, the other is for social 
services. The internal resistance was very strong. 
To proceed, the management had to work on counseling (,¾ ^ .工作）ofthe 
management and the workers to lead them through the transition. 
The Company has cut the number of its administrative divisions from 55 to 19 
and reduced its staff size from 1,270 to 417. 
On the other hand, the positive aspect about the personnel restructuring is that 
it effectively reduced the burdens of the Company; not only in term of the reduced 
total no. of employees, but also the release of the Company from the traditional 
burdenofthe ' i ronbowl" concept. 
The workers instead of viewing the Company as their permanent shelter as 
thus lack of incentive to perform, would have to perform with reasonable quality to 
have their contract be extended. It is a pressure for the life of the workers, but also a 
positive pressure for motivating people. 
The measures are important in establishing the confidence of foreign investors 
in a giant SOE as the Company. 
The Company had also established appraisal system to increase efficiency of 




As part of the Restructuring, the Company entered into a service agreement on 
1993 with Jinshan to ensure the continuous provision of services such as 
transportation, machinery maintenance, medical care and technical training. The rate 
charged by Jinshan for services are determined by reference to levels mandated by the 
Shanghai municipal government or the PRC government, or to applicable industry 
standards, or to market price negotiated on a case by case basis. The source of funds 
for Jinshan is mainly from the share dividends from the about 60% share holding of 
the Sinopec in the Company. 
Besides, the management of the pension fund and the insurance was 
transferred to the government agencies, supported by 25% of the salary of the 
n 
employee. 
The restructuring separates the social function from the business function for 
the Company. Jinshan transferred the social responsibilities to the central 
management of the government and as service charge against the Company. The 
Company would be able to focus its resources in the profit-generating function. 




The first global offering of l .68b H-shares in July 1993，amount which 840M 
shares was issued in Hong Kong at HK$1.58 and the rest was issued as ADR ( equal 
to 100 H-shares ) in the US and Europe. This was the first ever global issue o f H -
shares by a SOE and symbolized the opening of the global market capital market for 
SOEs fund raising. The reaction was, however, less enthusiastic than expected due to 
improper promotion and the concem over the risk of the giant SOEs, etc. 
Later the same year, there was the first A-share Public issue of 550M shares 
raised RMB1.6b. 
Both issues opened up the channels for subsequent fund raising for the 
company through new issues and placement. In 1994，the Company further issued 
320M A-shares and in 1996 and 1997，it placed 500M and 150M H-shares to the 
existing shareholders. 
The capital market becomes a strong backbone for the financing o f the 
Company. 
Table 23 
The Share Issuing Record ofShanghai Petrochemical ( 1993- 1997) 
7/93 10/93 6/94 8/96 1/97 Total 
H-Shares (Mil shares) T ^ 5 ^ TSO ” 2 , 3 3 0 
Sh. Price(HKD) L ^ ~~: 2.075 ~ ~ Z 2 8 
A-Shares (pub + legal per) (mil) 550 320 m 
Sh. Price (RMB) ^ ~ ~ 2 4 0 
Total Capital Raised (HK$ m/RMB m) 2,654 1,650 “ ~ 7 6 8 “ 1 , 0 3 8 3 ^ - ~ 





( inMilshares) |7 /93 1993l 1 9 9 4 | ~ 1 9 9 5 | ~ 1 9 9 6 | 1,997| % share 
StaS 4,000 4,000 4 ^ ~ 4 ^ “ 4 , 0 0 0 4,000 ~ 5 5 . 6 % 
LegalpersonA B o " ~ ~ ~ m 150 l50 f l 0 2.1% 
Public A-share 400 720 l W 720 720 ~ 1 0 . 0 % 
H-Share 1,680 1,680 TMO ~~~U6M ~ ~ 2 j M 2,330 ~ 3 2 . 4 % 
T ^ 5,680 6,230 6^50 ~"6 ,550 “ 7 , 0 5 0 7,200 100.0% 
Source: Collection ofdata from the newspaper, prospectus and annual report of Shanghai Petrochemical 
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Figure 19. The Ownership Structure ofShanghai Petrochemical Co. Ltd. (1993-1997) 
Though the Company has undertaken several times of new issues and the stake 
of the government in the Company was diluted as a result. 
However, the share holding of the government, the state share, remains the 
majority though decreased from the 70% of the first issues to the 56% in 1998. Smce 
the investors in public offer holds relatively small shares, there is not possible to have 
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Figure 22. Total Asset and Net Asset (1992-1996) 
Source : Collection ofdata for the above three figures from Annual reports ofShanghai Petrochemical 
The Company reached its height for growth; the asset increased from 
RMB11.5b in 1992 to RMB 19b. The net asset increased from RMB2,848M to RMB 
11,900M. Net asset per share increased form RMB 1.25 in 1993 to RMBL69 in 1996� 
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The asset value for state holding of56.7% raised from RMB4b to 6 � 7 7 5 b � T h e 
asset value of state was not only preserve, but achieved remarkable growth. 
Table 25 
Financial Ratios 
Financial Ratio 1555 1995 1996 
Gross Profit Margin l9% 2 l% 12% 
Return on Asset 9% 0 % 5% 
Return on Equity T^o 丽 9% 
Long-Term Debt/Equity "2l% l7% 17% 
TotalDebt/Equity 7 l% 60% 61% 
Interest / Profit ^ ^ 5 6 J 0 3.60 
Depreciation/Sales JT5 m 344 
S o u r c e :香港股票投資指南（ 1 9 9 5， 1 9 9 6 , 1997) 
Tax Benefit 
As the first batch of SOEs to be listed in Hong Kong, the Company 
enjoys of low income tax o f l 5%, down from the original 55%. 
Corporate Strategy 
Market-orientation — away from the planned economy 
The invisible control and induced pressure of the market price in the 
international stock markets, non-regular visits and investigation of the financial 
institutions, increased the consciousness of the management towards financial 
performance of the Company. 
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With the liberalization of prices, removal interest subsidies and tax reform, the 
Company faces increasing pressure in competition, profit margin, which led it to a 
more market-oriented management approach. 
Management 
The management adopted various policies to increase the internal efficient and 
management quality. 
Market Sensitivity 
They restructured the pricing decision mechanisms that the Company moved 
from passive adjustment of prices to active control. 
To increase the sensitivity to market changes, they fbrther developed their 
market intelligence networks for major products and raw materials. The Company 
also set up units for market research and product tracing. 
The Company also seek to improve the product mix to produce high profit 
margin products in reaction to the price and cost pressure. 
Incentive System (模擬市場目標利潤經濟貴任制考核） 
Starting from 1994, the Company piloted a new internal incentive system. 
The traditional incentive system under Contract Responsibility System, in 
which the production units are appraised according to the production units， 
production cost and quality. 
The new system appraised the performances according to the profit arrived at 
from the market prices along with various other production targets, the compensation 
was computed. Upper and lower limits were not set as for the compensation. 
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• With reference to the market price, the Company greatly increased the internal 
transfer pricing for raw materials, public construction projects and the 
intermediate products. 
• Each production units has to sign contracts (模擬市場目標利潤經濟貴 
任制協議書）w i t h the Company that the production unit would pass on the 
production targets down to the level of its worker. 
• Each production units had an increased ownership of their production and placed 
more emphasis on cost control. 
Crude Oil Processed and Unit Profit 
(1992-1996) 
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Figure 23. Crude Processed and Unit Profit for Crude Oil (1992-1996) 
The system changed from the passive high-level executive ordering style to 
the active participation of the workers, from the production management to 
production efficiency management. It forced the back-end production unit to face 
directly the pressure ofmarket competition and incorporated the market, price, cost, 
capital expenditure and customer needs into their considerations. 
It greatly motivated the workers to press for higher profitability and ensure the 
profit growth of the Company. 
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Cost Control 
With the years of operation in the capital market, the Company understood the 
importance ofcost competition in the international market. With the same production 
facilities, even the labor cost in PRC is lower, the overall cost is still not as 
competitive as the foreign counterpart. 
To counter balance the pressure, the Company seek to increase its efficiency. 
For example, in 1993 the reduced the frequency of the company's 45 days a year 
inspection and repair work on the production line. The utilization rate of the 
machinery was increased. 
In 1996, the Company introduced a financial management system for cost 
control, putting the main emphasis for increasing efficiency in cost control. 
The Company was divided into 3 levels: first level was the Company 
responsible for the investment decision, second was the production factory 
management responsible for the profit and the third level is the production plants 
responsible for cost control. 
The three level ofmanagement formed three level of control over the 
performance. Each level set up their own management goals and measures, each level 
had their own accounting book and consolidated to the upper level. Workers were 
responsible for their part ofthe cost control. 
Debt Management 
Through the global offering of2.33b H-shares (including issues of 500M 
shares in Aug 1996 and 150M shares in Jan 1997) and the domestic A-share issue of 
870M shares, the Company raised USD 520M ( including the nearly USD 200 raised 
in the Aug. 1996 and Jan 1997 issues), and RMB241 from the two domestic A-share 
issues. 
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The Company used most of the ftmds, according its plan in the Prospectus, in 
the repayment offoreign debt to reduce financial expenses and foreign exchange 
exposure. 
The repayment offoreign debts and interests totaled USD 233 ( RMB 1.276b), 
and high-interest rate corporate bonds and coupon payment RMB 1.114b, and bank 
loan and interest and other liabilities totaled RMB607M. Total repayment amounted 
to RMB 3,000M. 
Among the repayment, the early retirement of two dollar-denominated debt of 
interest rates high as 8.3% and 8.6% p.a., not only reduced the financial expenditures, 
but also reduced the foreign exchange exposure. 
The retirement ofcorporate bond of interest rate exceeding 10% reduced the 
interest expense by as much as RMB 100M. 
Moreover, because the Company raised foreign currency through the issues of 
H-shares, their foreign debts and asset in foreign-currency balanced out, which 
reduced the potential loss in conversion after the exchange rate unification 
(外匯並軌）. 
The long-trgubling debt burdens was released and the Company reached a more healthy 
capital and financial structure. 
The debt to asset ratio falls from the 75.41% in 1992 to 36.72% of 1996. 
Current ratio increased from 1.28 in 1993 to 1.49 in 1996. Quick ratio increased from 
0.89 o f l993 to0.99at l996. 
As for the long-troublesome problem oftriangular-debt, the Company adopted 
the payment-first-and-delivery policy in 1993, the account receivable dropped from 
RMB 700M in 1992 to RMB500M in 1994. 
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Research & Development 
With the focus in market needs, their R&D placed emphasis in development of 
high-efficient, high-technology new products with economic of scales. The research 
management tried to adopt compensated transfer and compensated services to 
increase the incentives for the research people. 
Business Development 
With the capital from the initial and subsequent share issues, the Company is 
able to see its continuous strategic development. 
Most of the flmds from the first issue of H-shares have been used for the 
repayment of its foreign debts to lower the tension in financial leverage, and to 
support the facilities renewal to increase the production efficiency. 
In the later stage, the development of the company has changed into 
production expansion, either through facilities construction or formation ofJoint 
Ventures with foreign partners. The international exposure through the capital market 
has given the Company advantages in building up reputation for the trust ofand 
bargaining power to the foreign companies to form JVs. 
In the recent development, the capital raised has fueled the merger and 
acquisition activities along with the government's changing direction of encourage 







At the beginning of going into the international capital market, the first Global 
Offering ofH-shares, the reactions of the market not as enthusiastic as expected; the 
price of the shares fell below offer price after issue. One of the reasons being the 
promotion ofthe company was not properly done. The Company declined the 
requests for plant visits to the Company by the fmancial institutes. The financial 
information provided for the IPO was not detailed enough and the foreign exchange 
exposure was underestimated. The public and financial analysts have not proper 
information for them to clear of their concem over the giant SOE, one of the first H-
shares companies and thus unfavorable rumor was spread in the market. 
The Company took corrective measures afterwards by reappoint their public 
relation company in Hong Kong. To improve the public image, the new PR company 
suggested plant visits for the financial institutions whose changed their views in favor 
of the SOE after seeing the operations themselves. 
Increasing Disclosure 
The Company has taken other measures to increase its communications with 
the public. For example, since the H-share companies have no representative offices 
in Hong Kong, it has been hard for the media to contact them for inquiry. The 
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Company has set up regular press meeting in Hong Kong to reply to the inquiry from 
the media. 
Besides, the Company established new release system; every year after the 
release of the annual and interim report, they would proceed to conduct worldwide 
promotion activities, to deliver timely information to the investors. 
They had also established investor information inquiry system, regularly 
conduct global phone meeting with the investors to facilitate the mutual 
understanding. 
The annual report of the Company is also one of the few H-shares companies 
which have listed financial and accounting data in two separate sets according to the 
international and PRC accounting standards. 
The Company has won the Best Disclosure Award organized by the Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange in 1996. It is the first time that a Chinesejoint stock limited 
company being recognized for achieving high standards ofdisclosure. 
However, there are issues inviting doubts in the transparency ofthe 
management ofthe Company, which would be discussed in the later sessions. 
Management Incentives 
The directors and members of the Supervisory Committee who are also 
officers or employees ofthe Company receive certain other benefits-in-kinds, such as 
subsidized or free health care services, housing and transportation, etc. 
Since the H-shares company as the normal practice has the directors 
remuneration determined among themselves in the Board ofDirectors. 
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Table 26 
Profit and Directors and Supervisory Committee' Remuneration 
Y ^ 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Net P r o f i t ( R M B ' 0 0 0 ) 870,100 1,493,000 2,127,000 1,008,000 
Extraordinary Items (RMB '000) ~ - 160,000 
Net Profit adj for Extraordinary items 870,100 1,493,000 2,127,000 ~~1,168,000 
( R M B ' 0 0 0 )  
NetProfit(RMB'QOO) 96.4%| 71.6%| 42.5%| -45.1% 
Directors and Supv.Committee '“° — “ ° ° ° ° “ 214 199 344 470 
Remuneration ( RMB，000)  
~ ~ S a l a r y a n d OtherBenefits 133 ^ l6S 2 ^ 
Retirement Scheme Contributions 9 6 ^ ^ 
~ I ^ H H i i i ： n ^ 159— 231 
_.. ^ ^ _ _ . ^ ^ _ _ _ ^ ^ _ _ . . . ^ ^ ^ ^ — — . . , — M » « B = 8 8 g a B g = « g ^ B S S I ^ ^ = S S S S = ^ ^ S S S r ^=^BSaSBBI^SSeSSSX^^ S S S S ^ ^ = ^ B = ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ S = ^^^^^BSSSSSS^=^SS=S^S 
No. of Directors 7 5 7 9 
No. ofMembers ofSupervisory Committee 3 3 3 3 
Bonuses /Net Profit 0.0083% ~~0.0027% ~ 0 . 0 0 7 5 % ~~0 .0198% 
DirectorsTee/Net profit — 0.02% 0.01%| 0.02%| 0 ： ^  
Source: Annual Reports of Shanghai Petrochemical 
Top Personal Change and Implications 
There three major change of top management in the Company after listing; 
1. The promotion of the Chairman of the Board of Directors and the President, Mr. 
Wang Jiming,(王基銘）to be the Deputy General Manager of Sinopec (the 
holding company) in 1994. His position was substituted by the Vice Chairman of 
the Board ofDirectors and Vice President, Mr. Wu Yixing (吳亦新）• 
2. The resignation ofthe President Mr. Wu Yixing (吳亦新 ) f r o m the office 
without specific reason then as arrangement of the change ofposition. The 
President is changed to Mr. Lu Yiping (陸益平），a Vice President and who has 
been a Vice President ofJinshan, a subsidiary of the parent company. 
From the composition ofthe board of directors over the years oflisting, we 
can see that there is only movement among the parent company and her subsidiary 
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and all the top management had been servicing the group (parent company or SPCs ) 
for many years. Like most of the other H-shares companies changed from SOEs of 
long history, the top management remains with the company and few，if any, signs 
that there is any management mobility in the top management level in the SOEs. The 
manager market is not obvious, if indeed exist, in the SOEs. 
However, there is one of the very few exceptions being the other top 
management movement in the Company; 
3. The resignation of the Company Secretary, Mr. Chai Hongping (蔡洪平） in May 
1997. Mr. Chai was employed as the vice president in the Peregrine (Greater 
China) Division,(百富勤融資（中國）). 
Though the incident is a single example of the similar nature, the switching o fMr . 
Chai from a H-share company to a Hong Kong financial institution is an example 
o f the raising international exposure is bringing up the manager market o f the 
overseas listed companies. 
With the increasing contacts and co-operation of the Chinese management with 
international companies, especially, after going into the overseas capital market, it 
opens up chances for talented people to switch to better position as following the 
practices ofhead-hurting in the Hong Kong and other countries. 
Employees 
Labor Contract 
The Company introduced labor contracts to their labor system to increase 
management control and improved employee productivity through linking 
remuneration to productivity. The employees were employed under fixed term 3 to 5 
years fixed termed contract, which specify the employee's position，responsibilities, 
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remuneration and grounds for termination. At the end of the term period, they may be 
renewed with the agreement ofboth the Company and the employee. 
Employee Compensation 
The remuneration of the Company's employees includes salary and bonuses. 
The employees also received certain benefits in terms ofhousing, education and 
health services subsidized by the Company and other subsidies. 
The Company and the employees participate in a government pension scheme 
for retirement benefits. 
Employees，Ownership Building 
In 1994, the employees o f the Company had purchased an average o f l , 950 
stocks each. The workers shared the ownership of the Company, which produced 
incentives for them to work hard on theirjobs. 
"We are now masters of our own company, so we work harder and pay more 
attention to the company's production and management." expressed by a worker in 
the company's acrylic fiber mill. 
Thejoint-stock system has prompted not only the development o f t he 
Company, but also the income of its employees. 
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Issues Qpen to Questions 
The Government as the Majority Shareholder 
Complications in Ownership Relationship - The Maloritv Shareholder 
.Tinshan and the Company 
The Housing Reform 
Although the assets and liabilities related to social services had been 
transferred to the Jinshan in the Restructuring. Due to the lack oflegal clarity in this 
area, the Company remainsjointly and severally liable for debts and other obligations 
incurred by SPC and which Jinshan has assumed. 
Though Sinopec has given an indemnity for all claims against the Company 
arising from or in respect ofthe assets and liabilities assumed by Jinshan. 
In 1993, when the Company was listed in Hong Kong, the housing for the 
employees were transferred to the holding company to be managed under Jinshan� 
However, in 1996, after two years of management by the holding company, the 
Company had to write-offRMB160M for the disposal of staff quarters. 
The disposal of staff quarter to middle and low income staff was to confine 
with the "Regulations on the Implementation of the Sale of Staff Quarters" 
(關于出售公有房屋的實施細則）d a t e d 15 June 1994 issued by the Office of 
Shanghai Municipal Housing System Reform (上海市住房制度改革辦公室） a n d 
Shanghai Municipal Housing Administration (上海市房產管理局）.The Staff 
quarter was sold at their cost value less certain discounts prescribed by the 
Regulations, calculated according to the length of employment ofstaff, age, location 
and area ofthe staffquarters and incentive to the staff to acquire the staffquarters. 
The Company did not explain why the housing services had transferred to 
Jinshan, still the Company would be acquiring a large amount of staff quarters for its 
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staffbetween 1993 to 1996 (RMB 140M). Together with the retained staff quarter 
from the IPO, the Company had spent over RMB21OM on housing. 
The issue attracting questions is whether the H-shares companies has already 
been released from its social burden as the given impression in their prospectus. 
Among other H-shares companies with the similar case, Yizheng Chemical 
Fiber ( 1033) had transfer the right ofuse of the staff quarters to the parent company 
during restructuring, however, in the Housing Reform, the listed company has to bear 
all the loss of the parent company result from the disposal of the staffquarter. 
The government still had the power to change how the social responsibility's 
liabilities are allocated. 
Disclosure Issues 
Despite the fact that the Company has won the Best Disclosure Award ofthe 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange and adopted various disclosure measures. 
In the incident of the Housing Reform, the Company did not disclose the impact of 
the Housing Reform in the 1996 interim report even after the Stock Exchange had 
requested the H-share Company to disclose any impacts. 
In the 1996 Annual Report, the write-off was listed down with simple 
explanation. The Hong Kong Stock Exchange as the market regulator act upon by 
requesting the company to delivery a detailed disclosure ofthe write-offin a 
subsequent announcement. 
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The RoIe Conflicts 
Competitive Activities 
After the Restructuring, Sinopec exercises ownership on behalfof the 
government; as majority shareholder, it continuously control the target ofproduction 
and the product pricing. For any investment over RMB 300M ( USDlOM), approval 
from the Sinopec is required^ Sinopec will be able to control the vote on all matters 
submitted to a vote ofthe Company's shareholders, including the election ofal l the 
Directors. 
Besides, Sinopec and other government agenciesjointly decided on the supply 
and price of the crude oil which are influential items for the Company, however, at 
the same time, Sinopec, as a ministry-level enterprise, owns and has controlling 
interests in other petrochemical enterprise which are competitors ofthe Company, 
The Protection ofMinority Shareholders' Interest 
The Sinopec has confirmed in writing in the equal treatment of the Company 
and its subsidiaries, that is, the Company will be treated no less favourably than the 
other enterprises under Sinopec's control. In addition, the Articles ofAssociation 
provide that controlling shareholders shall not exercise its voting rights in a manner 
prejudicial to the interest of the shareholders generally. 
However, there has not been any experience in the PRC in the enforcement of 
such provisions by minority shareholders. 
The Shanghai Jin-Yang Acrylic Plant Acquisition 
8 The security industry expects that the central government would gradually released the power to the 
management ofthe Company. 
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In Aug. 1996，the Company acquired the Shanghai Jin-Yang Acrylic Plant 
whose debt-to-asset ratio was as high as 99%. 
Table 27 
Financial Data for The Shanghai Jin-Yang Acrylic Plant Acquisition 




Long Term Debts (710) 
Short Term Debts (138) 
Source: Hong Kong Economic Times, 20 Aug., 1996 
Jin-Yang had low profitability in 1995 with only RMB 1.9M profit. The 
Company said that the acquisition was mainly for market share growth. However, 
before the acquisition the Company had guaranteed part of the debt ofJin-Yang，even 
though the Company and Jin-Yang were competitors and could not directly access 
management information ofJin-Yang. The Company did not disclose the reason for 
providing the guarantee for Jin-Yang (its competitor). 
The speculation was that the Company was acquiring Jin-Yang because it 
could not repay the debts. After the acquisition, the Company assumed all the debts of 
Jin-Yang. 
Disclosure issues 
According to the Company, the information on the guarantee was listed under 
the item ofcontingent liabilities in 1995 annual report. However, since there was only 
simple disclosure of the total sum. 
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The potential problem here is that there is potential rooms for the company to 
act in favor ofthird parties or the major shareholders who is controlling the board to 
enter into some deals which might not be of the interests of all shareholders. 




The listing of SOEs brought tremendous benefits to the SOEs themselves, the 
governments, the employees and the society as a whole. 
For the SOEs, listing provides the resolutions，even only partial resolutions to 
the long-troublesome burdens of the SOEs in financial and social aspects. The change 
o f the ownership structure attempts to separate the government from the enterprises 
that would results in more open-minded, efficient and market-driven management. 
The capital market becomes the cost-effective channel of future developments, that 
the transaction costs ofcapital are reduced. The introduction of market and self-
monitoring mechanisms to a certain extents reshapes the effect of the agency and 
uncertainty issues in a more constructive way. The listing ofH-shares brought the 
SOEs to better compete in the international platform. 
On the other hand, the management has to work to perform to the investors in 
the market and their freedom in management is constrained by the strict supervisory 
and disclosure requirement of the market. Market price become the index oftheir 
performance and market discipline is to be enforced to the rule-breakers. The manager 
market, however,.has not yet existed due to the ownership ofthe state and interest of 
the existing parties. 
The listing of SOEs relieved the Government from the burden of SOEs. It 
helps preserve and grow the value of the state-owned assets, instead oflossing them 
as before. 
Under the economic reform, the Government seeks to create an environment 
where the market has the control through bring price to market, reducing interest rate 
and tax subsidies, introducing fmancial system reform, etc. 
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In the internal management, the reform comes form the change ofownership 
and management structure, separating welfare function from business entities, and the 
introduction ofthe supervisory mechanisms from internal structure, the market and 
the media and public control, etc. 
However, the extent ofreleasing control is still far fall behind the standard of 
market economy. A level-playing field in price, banking, taxation and wage and labor 
system are yet to create. The linkage with the government still is the source ofsupport 
for the listed H-share companies, in term of the ease of financing, approval 
procedures, and various subsidies remain. Their state links mean they are still 
protected from the full discipline of the market. 
The intervention of government remains strong in both the market and the 
SOEs. In the market, the protection of the market, the policy directing development 
emphasis in various industries, the interest rate and credit discrimination by class of 
ownership, the quota system in the selection oflisting companies are only few of the 
traces of government intervention. 
The problems ofnon-existence ofliquidity of the state-owned shares prevail� 
In the control of SOEs, the Government exerts its power as the absolute majority 
shareholders. The internal control over the management remains strong through the 
appointment, promotion ofthe Board ofDirectors, and other senior management, the 
voting power in the shareholders' meeting, government policy still have great impact 
to the management ofthe SOEs, e.g. the Housing Reform Policies, etc. 
For the people, the ways ofliving are reshaped. The income ofpeople 
increases through their productive performances and ownership sharing of the 
companies. They were left in a more competitive employment environment that they 
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have to build up their skills to survive. The social welfare is less dependable but the 
upside oftheir income and thus the quality of l i fe is also lifted. 
The effects of all the reforms taken place has reduced the agency cost, 
transaction cost and uncertainty in one way or another. Through the listing of SOEs 
as H share companies in Hong Kong, not all the problems in the three aspects are 
solved, there are still unsolved problems and even newly introduced problems. 
First ofall , the mechanism ofhaving the board of directors to represent the 
share holders and monitor the operation of the enterprise had prevent the senior 
management from acting against the interest of the shareholders. Furthermore, the 
supervisors committee also looks at appropriateness of the control exercised by the 
board ofdirectors. However, with the State remains to be the major shareholder, the 
appointment ofdirectors is virtually the same as the SOEs without listing. Having the 
Chairman of the board ofdirectors be the General Manager at the same time，the full 
effectiveness of the board ofdirectors representing the interest of the shareholder is 
not achieved. 
The appointment ofthe independent non-executive directors and supervisors 
may not have been appointed with the best candidates, as many ofthose are 
professionals and workers of the enterprise respectively. 
A great improvement over traditional SOEs, the remuneration of the directors 
is linked to the performance ofthe enterprise so that the directors could have more 
incentive in maximizing the profit of the enterprise. However, the ceiling limit set on 
the directors' obtainable rewards, typically at a few multiple of the average workers, 
had not considered the weight of contribution provided by the directors. Maximum 
performance of the director is not adequately encouraged. 
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The lacking ofcompany shares held by employee, especially for those H share 
companies who do not have A share listed in either the Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange, also limit the commitment ofboth the worker and the management. 
Despite the ceiling limit set on the salary level, the board of directors uses the 
reporting system to prevent the management from exploiting the asset of the 
enterprise for self-interest and luxury other than the need of necessary public relation 
expenditure. 
After listing, the operation and performance of the companies are closely 
monitored by the market via the financial institutions. However, the responsiveness 
ofthose H share companies in responding to the public has to be improved. 
The previously focused social burden like providing housing, education and 
medical services, etc., to the employee have been improved in some cases by spinning 
offthose responsibility during the restructuring. Agreement is set between the 
holding company and the listed company that the holding company will provide the 
social benefit to the employees ofthe listed company. Yet, there is case that the 
holding company transfers the responsibility ofproviding the social welfare back to 
the listing company later after the listing. 
Another remarkable fact is that the listed H share company may heavily 
depends on the parent company in providing the raw material for normal operation. 
Typical cases are the providing ofcrude oil from the parent companies to the listed H 
share petrochemical companies. 
Undoubtedly, the government strongly supports the listing ofsome SOEs as 
the H share companies ofthe newly listed H share companies enjoy a 15% rebate 
from the 33% corporate tax and the total preparation time for listing is not long at alL 
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Further control on the H share companies by the financial market, the manager 
market, the product competition, the merger and acquisition and the restructuring of 
the share ownership may not be effectively carried out. The limitation has been the 
emphasis of the investors on the government policy, the limited pool ofcandidates 
and the government attitude to appoint within the enterprise, the partially protected 
environment and the position of government being the major shareholder holding 
non-liquid state share respectively. 
In term oftransaction cost, the listing as H share companies do provide 
alternative way offinancing - the equity financing. While the debt fmancing may not 
be secured easily especially under macroeconomic control introduced by former vice 
Prime Minister Zhurongqi, the cost of equity financing has been lower than the debt 
financing ofthe same period, yet without considering costs other than interest cost in 
securing a bank loan successfully. 
Lasts, but not the least, the uncertainty of the H share companies had been 
reduced in a number ofways. The source of financing, more efficient and effective 
management, the preservation and growth of state assets, further possibility oflisting 
in other stock market and the exercising of autonomy are all improved. However, the 
uncertainty for being too reliance on parent company, the convertibility ofRMB, the 
separation of Government from the enterprise, the appointment ofprofessional 
managers and the political and economical risks have not been eliminated. Moreover, 
the speculation activities in the market and the possible returning of social burden 
from the parent company (if applicable) are introduced. 
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APPENDDCI 
THE BACKGROUND OF THE BEIJING NORTH STAR 
COMPANY LEMITED 
The Beijing North Star Company Limited is a very young SOEs raised in the 
1990 Asian Games. 
In 1986, the predecessor ofBeijing North Star Group Company (北京 
北辰實業集團公司）,"the BNS Group", was appointed by the Beijing Municipal 
Government to construct the Asian Games Village. The development comprises 
commercial and residential service flats, a hotel, a convention and exhibition center as 
well as other ancillary facilities to service the Eleventh Asian Games. BNS Group 
Company was duly established on 9出 March, 1990. In August of the same year, the 
construction ofthe whole ofthe Asian Games Village was completed. 
After the closing ofthe 11^ Asian Games in Oct. 1990, the Group commenced 
its property investment operation by letting out the various properties and facilities 
which were constructed for the Asian Game Village. The investment properties have 
brought stable rental income to the Group since the commencement of the Group's 
property investment operation. 
In Feb. 1990, the Group commenced its property development operations. In 
1993, the Group completed Super Garden Villas, its first development property. Since 
1993, the Group has also developed other residential projects including Kerrie Plaza, 
Shi Ji Cun Estate and Xing Chen Mansion Residential Building. In June 1994, the 
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Group established Beijing North Star Real Estate Development Company Limited 
(北京北辰房地產開發股份有限公司）， t h e principal business of which is 
property development. The Group holds an interest of83.09% of the NS Development 
Company. 
The Beijing North Start Company Limited (北京北辰實業有限公司）w a s 
established on the 2"^ April, 1997 as ajoint stock limited company having BNS 
Group as the sole promoter. Under the restructuring of the asset and liabilities, stated-
owned assets and liabilities representing a net asset value o f R M B 1，774.8M in 
connection with the Group's current property investment and property development 
businesses were transferred from BNS Group Company to the Company. The Group 
are the major shareholder holding 65.4% interest in the Company. 
The post-restructuring ownership structure is as the following, 
BNS Group Company, Holders ofH Shares 
holder of State-owned shares 
65.4% 34.6% 
The Company 
(Property hivestment and Development, hotel, 
restaurant and other ancillary facilities operations) 
83.09% 72.35% ~"“ 59.81% 
NS Development ~~BeijingRecreation Center~~ BeijingWuzhou MillerBeer 
Company Co. Ltd. Garden Restaurant Joint Venture 
(property development) (recreation center operation ) Company Limited � r ^ _ | (restaurant operation) 
51.0% 
Beijing Jiang Zhuang Hu 
Property Co. Ltd. 
(property development) 
Figure 24. The Post-Restructuring Structure ofBeijing North Star 
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